UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-13-2011

State v. Lippert Clerk's Record Dckt. 38613

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Lippert Clerk's Record Dckt. 38613" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2917.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2917

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

(

In the
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ROBERT S . LIPPERT ,

AY 13 2011

Defendant-Appellant .

Appealed from the District Court of the Second
Judicial District of the State of Idaho , in and
for Clearwater County
Honorable CARL B. KERRICK , District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
SUPREME COURT NO. 38613
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

ROBERT LIPPERT,
Defendant/Appellant
On Appeal.

CLERK'S RECORD

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Clearwater

BEFORE THE HONORABLE CARL B. KERRICK, DISTRICT JUDGE

Counsel for Respondents
Mr. Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0188

Counsel for Appellant
State Appellant Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703
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I District Court - Clearwater County

User: COURTNEY

ROA Report

1ge 1 of 7

Case: CR-2005-0000561 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
Defendant: Lippert, Robert S

tate of Idaho vs. Robert S Lippert
lte

Code

User

3/2005

NEWC

CHRISTY

New Case Filed

Randall W. Robinson

CRCO

CHRISTY

Criminal Complaint

Randall W. Robinson

AFFD

CHRISTY

Affidavit For Initial Determination Of Probable
Cause For Issuance Of Arrest Warrant

Randall W. Robinson

MOTN

CHRISTY

Motion For Arrest Warrant And For Bond

Randall W. Robinson

ORDR

CHRISTY

Order For Arrest Warrant And For Bond

Randall W. Robinson

WARI

CHRISTY

Warrant Issued - Arrest Bond amount: 75000.00
Defendant: Lippert, Robert S

Randall W. Robinson

PROS

CHRISTY

Prosecutor assigned John A Swayne

Randall W. Robinson

WART

RENEE

Warrant Returned Defendant: Lippert, Robert S

Randall W. Robinson

HRSC

RENEE

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 07/11/2005
01:00 PM)

Randall W. Robinson

ARRN

RENEE

Hearing result for Arraignment held on
07/11/200501 :00 PM: Arraignment 1 First
Appearance

Randall W. Robinson

FINS

RENEE

Financial Statement And Order

Randall W. Robinson

ORPD

RENEE

Defendant: Lippert, Robert S Order Appointing
Public Defender Public defender John R
Hathaway

Randall W. Robinson

ACKR

RENEE

Acknowledgement Of Rights

Randall W. Robinson

NCO

RENEE

No Contact Order

Randall W. Robinson

HRSC

RENEE

Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 07/25/2005
10:00 AM)

Randall W. Robinson

12/2005

RNCO

RENEE

Return On No Contact Order-Defendant

Randall W. Robinson

13/2005

SCDS

SUE

State's Compliance With Discovery

Randall W. Robinson

14/2005

SUPP

VICKY

State's
Supplemental Response To Request
For Discovery

Randall W. Robinson

18/2005

RDIS

VICKY

Request For Discovery

Randall W. Robinson

20/2005

SUBR

RENEE

Subpoena Returned-Becky Drewery

Randall W. Robinson

21/2005

SDIS

SUE

State's supplemental discovery

John H. Bradbury

SDIS

SUE

State's discovery compliance

John H. Bradbury

BOUN

RENEE

Hearing result for Preliminary held on 07/25/2005 Randall W. Robinson
10:00 AM: Bound Over (after Prelim)

CMIN

RENEE

Court Minutes

Randall W. Robinson

HRSC

RENEE

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 07/26/2005
03:00 PM)

John H. Bradbury

ORBO

RENEE

Order Binding Over

Randall W. Robinson

INFO

RENEE

Information

John H. Bradbury

MOTN

CHRISTY

Motion To Disqualify Judge John H. Bradbury

John H. Bradbury

ORDJ

SUE

Order Regarding Disqualification of Judge

John H. Bradbury

11/2005

25/2005

26/2005

Judge

HRi?&GISTI~~@F ACTI01't1earing result for Arraignment held on
07/26/2005 03:00 PM:

Hearing Vacated

John H. Bradbury
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Case: CR-2005-0000561 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
Defendant: Lippert, Robert S

,tate of Idaho vs. Robert S Lippert
lte

Code

User

27/2005

CHJG

SUE

Change Assigned Judge

Carl B. Kerrick

28/2005

HRSC

SUE

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 08/03/2005
10:30 AM)

Carl B. Kerrick

RESP

JANIS

State's Supplemental Discoveryf

John H. Bradbury

MOTN

SUE

Motion for preparation of preliminary hearing
transcript

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

SUE

Affidavit of council for transcript

Carl B. Kerrick

ARRN

VICKY

Hearing result for Arraignment held on
08/03/200510:30 AM: Arraignment! First
Appearance

Carl B. Kerrick

APNG

VICKY

Appear & Plead Not Guilty

Carl B. Kerrick

CMIN

VICKY

Court Minutes

Carl B. Kerrick

ORDR

VICKY

Order for Payment of Transcript Preparation

Carl B. Kerrick

SOlS

SUE

State's Discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

SCDS

SUE

State's Compliance With Discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

ORDR

RENEE

Order Setting Jury Trial and Scheduling
Proceedings

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

RENEE

Hearing Scheduled (Final Pretrial and Motions
10/20/2005 10:30 AM)

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

RENEE

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 11/07/200509:30 Carl B. Kerrick
AM)

HRSC

VICKY

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
10/26/200510:30 AM)

Carl B. Kerrick

VICKY

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Carl B. Kerrick

SUPP

VICKY

State's

Carl B. Kerrick

RDIS

JANIS

State's Request For Discovery Disclosure; Alibi
Demand

Carl B. Kerrick

30/2005

NOTC

SUE

Notice of intent

Carl B. Kerrick

312005

SUPP

CHRISTY

State's Supplemental Discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

22/2005

SRQD

SUE

Supplemental Request For Discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

26/2005

SUPP

VICKY

State's Supplemental Response To Request
For Discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

114/2005

MOTN

SUE

Motion for order compelling response to state's
request for discovery and alibi demand

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

SUE

Affidavit in support of motion for order compelling Carl B. Kerrick
response to State's request for discovery and alibi
demand

SOlS

SUE

State's Discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

RESP

SUE

Response To Request For Discoverylplaintiff

Carl B. Kerrick

1/7/2005

SOlS

SUE

State's supplemental discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

1/13/2005

SUBR

SUE

Subpoena Returned

Carl B. Kerrick

SUBR

SUE

Subpoena Returned

Carl B. Kerrick

212005

3/2005

12/2005
17/2005

18/2005
19/2005

1/5/2005

REGISTER OF ACTION

Judge

Supplemental Discovery
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Ite

Code

User

117/2005

AFFD

SUE

Affidavit of council in support of motion for order
compelling response to discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

SUE

Affidavit of council in support of motion for order
compelling response to defs. request for
discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

MOTN

SUE

Motion in limine re: statements

Carl B. Kerrick

MOTN

SUE

Motion in Limine (prior bad acts)

Carl B. Kerrick

MOTN

SUE

Motion in Limine (domestic violence)

Carl B. Kerrick

MOTN

SUE

Motion for order compelling response to
defendant's request for discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

NOTH

SUE

Notice Of Hearing

Carl B. Kerrick

CO NT

SUE

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 11/07/2005
09:30 AM: Continued

Carl B. Kerrick

HRVC

SUE

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on
10/26/2005 10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated

Carl B. Kerrick

CMIN

SUE

Court Minutes

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

SUE

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/26/200609:30 Carl B. Kerrick
AM)

HRHD

SUE

Hearing result for Final Pretrial and Motions held
on 10/20/200510:30 AM: Hearing Held

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

SUE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/16/2005 10:00
AM)

Carl B. Kerrick

121/2005

ADDL

RENEE

State's Supplemental Discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

124/2005

CO NT

SUE

Continued (Jury Trial 01/23/200609:30 AM)

Carl B. Kerrick

126/2005

SCDS

SUE

State's Compliance With Discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

SCDS

SUE

State's Compliance With Discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

MEMO

SUE

Memorandum in support of State's Notice of
Intent

Carl B. Kerrick

NOTC

SUE

Supplemental Notice of Intent

Carl B. Kerrick

128/2005

SUPR

SUE

Supplemental Response To Request For
Discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

1212005

SRQD

SUE

Supplemental Request For Discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

116/2005

HRHD

SUE

Hearing result for Motion held on 11/16/2005
10:00 AM: Hearing Held

Carl B. Kerrick

CMIN

SUE

Court Minutes

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

SUE

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference

Carl B. Kerrick

119/2005

120/2005

127/2005

117/2005

Judge

01/06/200602:00 PM) Court will initiate the call
SUE

118/2005

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

SUE

Affidavit in support of out-of-county service of
subpoena

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

SUE

Affidavit in support of out-of-county service of
subpoena

Carl B. Kerrick

State's Supplemental Discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

REGISTER OF ACTION
1512005

Notice Of Hearing

ADDL

RENEE

/}
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Defendant: Lippert, Robert S

tate of Idaho vs. Robert S Lippert
lte

Code

User

17/2005

AFFD

SUE

Affidavit

Carl B. Kerrick

113/2005

SUBR

CHRISTY

Subpoena Returned - Mike Perman

Carl B. Kerrick

114/2005

NOTC

SUE

Notice of motion hearing

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

SUE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/04/200602:00
PM)

Carl B. Kerrick

116/2005

SDIS

SHARON

State's Supplemental Discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

120/2005

PETN

SUE

Petition to compel attendance

Carl B. Kerrick

PETN

SUE

Petition to compel attendance

Carl B. Kerrick

PETN

SUE

Petition to compel attendance

Carl B. Kerrick

PETN

SUE

Petition to compel attendance

Carl B. Kerrick

CERT

SUE

Certificate to secure attendance

Carl B. Kerrick

CERT

SUE

Certificate to secure attendance

Carl B. Kerrick

CERT

SUE

Certificate to secure attendance

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

SUE

Affidavit in support of out-of-state subpoena

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

SUE

Affidavit in support of out-of-state subpoena

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

SUE

Affidavit in support of out-of-state subpoena

Carl B. Kerrick

MOTN

SUE

Motion for order to take deposition

Carl B. Kerrick

NOTH

SUE

Notice Of Hearing

Carl B. Kerrick

SUPP

SUE

State's Supplemental Response To Request
For Discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

NOTC

SUE

Notice to use deposition at jury trial

Carl B. Kerrick

SUBR

SUE

Subpoena Returned

Carl B. Kerrick

SUBR

SUE

Subpoena Returned

Carl B. Kerrick

SUBR

SUE

Subpoena Returned

Carl B. Kerrick

SUBR

SUE

Subpoena Returned

Carl B. Kerrick

SUBR

SHARON

Subpoena Returned

Carl B. Kerrick

SUBR

SHARON

Subpoena Returned

Carl B. Kerrick

MOTN

SUE

Motion in limine objection to deposition testimony Carl B. Kerrick

MOTN

SUE

Motion in limine objection to 404B evidence

Carl B. Kerrick

HRHD

SUE

Hearing result for Motion held on 01/04/2006
02:00 PM: Hearing Held

Carl B. Kerrick

CMIN

SUE

Court Minutes

Carl B. Kerrick

HRHD

SUE

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on
Hearing Held Court will
initiate the call

Carl B. Kerrick

121/2005

122/2005

.123/2005

128/2005

3/2006

4/2006

5/2006

Judge

01/06/200602:00 PM:

10/2006

MISC

SUE

District Court Jury Panel

Carl B. Kerrick

18/2006

SDIS

CHRISTY

State's Supplemental Discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

19/2006

SUBR

SHARON

Subpoena Returned

Carl B. Kerrick

20/2006

ST&EGIST~~F ACTIONState Exhibit List and witness list

Carl B. Kerrick

I

I
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Defendant: Lippert, Robert S

tate of Idaho

VS.

Ite

Code

User

WI2006

WITN

SUE

Defendant's witness & exhibit list

Carl B. Kerrick

DFJI

SUE

Defendants Requested Jury Instructions

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

SUE

Affidavit of council for preparation of pre-trial
hearing transcript

Carl B. Kerrick

MOTN

SUE

Motion for preparation of pre-trial hearing
transcript at public expense

Carl B. Kerrick

SRJI

SUE

State's Requested Jury Instructions

Carl B. Kerrick

~3/2006

JTST

SUE

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 01/23/2006
09:30 AM: Jury Trial Started

Carl B. Kerrick

~5/2006

SOlS

SUE

State's Supplemental Discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

~6/2006

WITN

SUE

Witness List

Carl B. Kerrick

JURY

SUE

Jury Chart

Carl B. Kerrick

EXLT

SUE

Exhibit List

Carl B. Kerrick

JUIN

SUE

Jury Instructions Filed

Carl B. Kerrick

VERD

SUE

Verdict Form

Carl B. Kerrick

ORDR

SUE

Order for psycholsexual evaluation

Carl B. Kerrick

CMIN

SUE

Court Minutes

Carl B. Kerrick

FOGT

SUE

Found Guilty After Trial

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

SUE

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 04/21/2006
10:00 AM)

Carl B. Kerrick

CONT

SUE

Hearing result for Sentencing held on 04/21/2006 Carl B. Kerrick
10:00 AM: Continued

HRSC

SUE

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 04/27/2006
10:00 AM)

31/2006

Robert S Lippert

SUE

Judge

Notice Of Hearing

Carl B. Kerrick
Carl B. Kerrick
Carl B. Kerrick

26/2006

AFFD

VICKY

Affidavit For Restitution

27/2006

SENT

VICKY

Hearing result for Sentencing held on 04/27/2006 Carl B. Kerrick
10:00 AM: Sentencing

CMIN

VICKY

Court Minutes

Carl B. Kerrick

SNIC

VICKY

Sentenced To Incarceration (118-1506 Sexual
Abuse Of Child Under 16) Confinement
terms:Penitentiary determinate: 6
years. Penitentiary indeterminate: 9 years.

Carl B. Kerrick

SNPF

VICKY

Sentenced To Pay Fine 297.50 charge: 118-1506 Carl B. Kerrick
Sexual Abuse Of Child Under 16

RESO

VICKY

Restitution Ordered 25000.00 victim # 1

Carl B. Kerrick

COMI

VICKY

Commitment Of Imprisonment

Carl B. Kerrick

NOTA

RENEE

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

RENEE

Affidavit of Counsel

Carl B. Kerrick

MOTN

RENEE

Motion to Appoint State Appellate Public

Carl B. Kerrick

REGISTER OF ACTION Defender
ORDR

RENEE

Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender Carl B. Kerrick
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Case: CR-2005-0000561 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
Defendant: Lippert, Robert S

tate of Idaho

VS.

Ite

Code

User

~7/2006

APSC

RENEE

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Carl B. Kerrick

U2006

SUBR

SUE

Subpoena Returned

Carl B. Kerrick

3/2006

JDMT

SUE

Judgment of conviction

Carl B. Kerrick

SCAN

SUE

Scanned 5/16/06

Carl B. Kerrick

CJDM

SUE

Civil Judgment and Order of Restitution

Carl B. Kerrick

SCAN

SUE

Scanned 5/16/06

Carl B. Kerrick

RESO

SUE

Restitution Ordered 5000.00 victim # 2

Carl B. Kerrick

3/2006

NOTA

RENEE

Amended Notice of Appeal

Carl B. Kerrick

~7/2006

NLT

RENEE

Notice Of Lodging Reporter's Transcript and
Clerk's Record

Carl B. Kerrick

114/2006

LODG

RENEE

Notice of lodging of reporter's supplemental
transcript

Carl B. Kerrick

1812008

MOTN

SUE

Motion for status conference

Carl B. Kerrick

~3/2008

ORDR

RENEE

Order for telephonic status conference

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

RENEE

Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status
Conference 02/01/200809:00 AM) court to
initiate the call from NP Co. chambers

Carl B. Kerrick

31/2008

HRVC

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference
held on 02/01/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated
court to initiate the call from NP Co. chambers

Carl B. Kerrick

312008

REMT

RENEE

Remittitur

Carl B. Kerrick

3/2008

ORDR

VICKY

Order for telephonic status conference

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

VICKY

Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status
Conference 05/19/2008 11 :00 AM) Judge
Kerrick will initiate call from Chambers in Nez
Perce Co., Lewiston

Carl B. Kerrick

19/2008

HRHD

RENEE

Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference
held on 05/19/2008 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held
Judge Kerrick will initiate call from Chambers in
Nez Perce Co., Lewiston

Carl B. Kerrick

20/2008

ORDR

RENEE

Order for status/scheduling conference

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

RENEE

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
06/09/200801:30 AM)

Carl B. Kerrick

312008

CMIN

SUE

Court Minutes

Carl B. Kerrick

17/2008

ORDR

SUE

Order To Transport & Notice of Hearing

Carl B. Kerrick

HRHD

SUE

Hearing result for Status Conference held on
06/09/2008 01 :30 AM: Hearing Held

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

SUE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/27/2008 10:00
AM)

Carl B. Kerrick

INHD

RENEE

Hearing result for Motion held on 08/27/2008
10:00 AM: Interim Hearing Held

Carl B. Kerrick

27/2008
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Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ROBERT SCOTT LIPPERT,
Defendant.

CASE NO. CR05-0056l
ORDER FOR STATUS/SCHEDULING
CONFERENCE

This matter shall be set for Status/Scheduling Conference on June 9, 2008 at 1:30
p.m. Pacific Time at the Clearwater County Courthouse in Orofino. Defendant shall be present by
telephone and the Court will initiate the call. The Status/Scheduling Conference is to schedule a
hearing as required by the Court of Appeals in its Opinion in this cause dated December 19,2007
and the Remittitur dated April 17, 2008, attached.
Dated this )..o1\iay of May, 2008.

CARL B. KERRICK-District Judge

ORDER FOR STATUS/SCHEDULING
CONFERENCE

1

CERTIFICATE OF MAlLING
I hereby certify that a true copy of
the foregoing ORDER FOR STATUS/
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE was mailed,
postage prepaid, by the Ulltfrsigned at
Lewiston, Idaho, this;;?o day of
May, 2008, to:
Lori M. Gilmore
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
PO Box 2627
Orofmo ill 83544
John R. Hathaway
PO Box 271
Orofmo ill 83544
Robert Scott Lippert
Bonner County Jail
4001 NBoyer
Sandpoint ill 83864
Clerk of the Court
Clearwater County
POBox 586
Orofino ill 83544
Bonner County Jail
4001 N Boyer
Sandpoint ill 83864
PATTYO. WEEKS, Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOF. THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT LIPPERT,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR2005-1086

COUqT MINUTES

Carl Kerrick, District Judge Presiding
Lori Gilmore, Attorney for the Plaintiff
John Hathaway, Attorney for the Defendant
Keith Evans, Court Reporter
Date: 6/9/08 Tape: CD301-1 Time: 1:30 p.m.
Subject of Proceeding: Scheduling conference

--------------------------------------------------------------FOOTAGE:
1:30

Court gives introductions. Defendant present telephonically. Court advises that
there is still an issue pending pursuant to the Court of Appeals. Court advises the
defendant that this hearing is being '1eld as a scheduling conference. Court reads
the Court of Appeals directives. Court sets a hearing for August 27, 2008 at 10:00
a.m.

1:36

Mr. Lippert questions the Court regarding counsel and protocol at the hearing.

1:36

Court responds and explains the proc.ess at the hearing.

1:38

Mr. Lippert questions the court regarding witnesses.

1:39

Court advises that if there are witnesses then the court will review this issue at the
hearing.

Sue K. Summerton-Deputy clerk
COURT MINUTES - 1

1:39

Mr. Lippert questions the court regarding questions prior to the hearing.

1:39

Court advises the defendant may seld questions to him along with counsel.

1:40

Court in recess.

Sue K. Summerton - Deputy Clerk
COURT MINUTES - 2

Approved:

r!p?2J~)
District Judge

JUN. 17. 2008 2:47PM
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE S:l-~
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR fHE COUNTY OF CLEARWPlr6R
'~E:Pun'
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
- vs::- '

- --'

.

-~.\---

ROBERT LIPPERT,
Defendant.

CASE NO. CR2005-1086

, ORDER TO TRANSPORT
- _.)-- .- A"N1:tNOTICE"d'p}t~G-'-'- ---,,- ,--"-----,. )
)
)
)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THA-:- the Defendant. ROBERT LIPPERT, be
transported to the Clearwater County District Court. 150 Michigan Avenue, Orofino,
Idaho, for an eVidentiary hearing on August 27, 2008 at 10:00 a.m,
DATED this

1'7 iaay of June, 2008,

C2£~o

CARL KERRICK
District Judge
_"_

ORDER TO TRANSPORT AND
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1

_

__ \_

.. _

•• * _ o J . ..

_.

JUN, 17,2008 2:47PM

r "T
T

COURT

NO, 2832

p, 2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER TO TRANSPORT AND
NOTICE OF HEARING was m.ail~, postage prepaid, or hand delivered by the
undersigned at Orofino, Idaho this

1.W tJay of June, 2008 on:

Idaho Department of Correction
Central Records/Inmate Transport
FAX: 208-327-7444
John Hathaway
Attorney at Law
Courthouse Mail
Orofino, ID 83544
- -........ -...-.- ._-.:....",.... _.-

s ___

.--.:.....-~

--~-,:-.-

Robert Scott Lippert
Bonner County Jail
4001 N. Boyer
Sandpoint, 1083864
Clearwater County Sheriff
ClealWater County Courthouse
Orofino, 10 83544
Lori Gilmore
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Courthouse Mail
Orofino, ID 83544
Bonner County Sheriffs Office
4001 N. Boyer
Sandpoint, 10 83864

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By:

ORDER TO TRANSPORT AND
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2

~h
.~lYl h't1 iuYJ
Deputy
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO

v.
ROBERT S. LIPPERT

. CASE NO. CR-05-561
. NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION
OF COUNSEL AND WITHDRAWAL

-------------------)
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Jack
Hathaway, Public Defender, hereby stipulate to the substitution of Phelps & Associates,
PS, Private Counsel, as attorney of record for the Defendant in all further proceedings
and authorizing the withdrawal of Jack Hathaway from the above-entitled case. It is
further requested that copies of all future notices and pleadings should be directed to
2903 N. Stout Rd., Spokane, WA 99206-4373.

This stipulation is based upon the grounds that Defendant has secured Phelps &
Associates, PS as

prlva~e

Counsel in this matter, and it is in the best interest of the

Defendant and Jack Hathaway, Public Defender; that the substitution and withdrawal
be approved.

Stipulation for Substitution of Couusel
and Withdrawal -lof2

ji)

09/10/20}~8

WED 13:09

FA,! 599

802 Phelps & Associates

Ig] 003/003 .

DATED this /::; Day of September, 2008.

JA

DATEDthis \0

ATHAWAY
THDRAWING ATTORNEY

DaYOfseptember,:u

--

~..

____.

.

DOUGLAS D. PHELPS
SUBSTITUTING ATTORNEY

Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel
and Withdrawal -2 of 2
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Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County

me: 11:43 AM

Minutes Report
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User: RENEE

Case: CR-2005-0000561
Defendant: Lippert, Robert S
All Items

Hearing type:

EVidentiary Hearing

Minutes date:

08/27/2008

Assigned judge:

Carl B. Kerrick

Start time:

10:00 AM

Court reporter:

Nancy Towler

End time:

10: 11 AM

Minutes clerk:

Renee' Robins

Audio tape number: CD#293-2

Prosecutor:

Lori M. Gilmore

Defense attorney: John R Hathaway

Tape Counter: 1000

Tape Counter: 1002

Tape Counter: 1003
Tape Counter: 1003
Tape Counter: 1004

Tape Counter: 1006

Tape Counter: 1009

Court gives introductions, reviews the Court of Appeals decision and will conduct an
inquiry re: did Mr. Lippert have good cause to request new counsel on the 1st day of the
Trial and will give Mr. Lippert the 1st opportunity to argue his position.
Mr. Lippert advises the Court he was transported here but with no paperwork-it hasn't
caught up with him. He further advises he thought the hearing was at 1 PM and he has an
attorney coming from Spokane who isn't here yet. He advises he can't proceed without
his paperwork or his attorney.
Court asks the parties when the paperwork will be here. The bailiff advises the jail staff is
trying to locate it.
Court asks Mr. Lippert the name of his attorney. He responds Peter Jones. Court asks if
he is ready to proceed. He advises no as he hasn't talked to his attorney yet.
Court advises there is no contact by Mr. Jones to the Court, reviews the purpose of
today's proceedings is for Mr. Lippert to present his complaints re: Mr. Hathaway's
representation of him in the matter, allow Mr. Hathaway to respond and then render a
decision. Court advises it can reschedule the matter to allow Mr. Lippert proper
representation, he will continue to be held here until his paperwork arrives and asks the
jail to notify the Court when it does so it can reset the hearing.
Ms. Gilmore asks where the paperwork is. Mr. Lippert advises when he was shipped out
from ICC they were supposed to box it up & send it along, outlines the transport process &
what he's been told re: where it is.
Mr. Hathaway remarks.

Tape Counter: 1009

Mr. Lippert remarks.

Tape Counter: 1009

Ms. Gilmore advises she has a scheduling conflict with continuing @ 1 PM today.

Tape Counter: 1010

Court asks the jail staff, Ms. Gilmore & Mr. Hathaway to see if they can locate Mr.
Lippert's paperwork & once it gets here, it will reset the matter as soon as possible. Court
advises Mr. Lippert it would be helpful if his attorney would file something with the Court
and the attorneys.
Court in recess.

Tape Counter: 1011

/--)
Renee' Robins
COURT MINE}~~aty Clerk

APproved:~~i
District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
ROBERT S LIPPERT,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR2005-1086
ORDER TO TRANSPORT

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Defendant. ROBERT S LIPPERT, be
transported by the Idaho Department of Corrections back to the Idaho Department of
Corrections.
DATED this 15th day of September, 2008.

CARL B KERRICK
District Judge

ORDER TO TRANSPORT - 1

1dJ002/003

0')( J.

ESEP. 15. 2008·:< 2: 33PMut

2(H~

r

COURT~WATER

co

COURT --- NPC DIS

NO. 5643

P. 211oo3/oo3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER TO TRANSPORT was
mailed, faxed or hand delivered by the undersigned at Orofino, Jdah.o this 15th day of
September, 2008 on:
.
Idaho Department of Correction
Central Recordsllnmate Transport

Faxed: 208-327-7444)
Clearwater County Sheriff'S Office
Courthouse Mail, Orofino, Idaho 83544
Hand delivered
Loti M Gilmore
Clearwater County Deputy Prosecutor
CourthouseMail.Orofino.ID 83544
Hand delivered
Robert Scott Lippert
Clea,rwater County Jail
Courthous~ Mail, Orofino, ID 83544

Douglas D Phelps
Phelps &AssoCiates
2903 North Stout Road
Spokane,VVA 99260
Mailed

ORDER TO TRANSPORT - 2

----------~~------------------------------------~~----~J~
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Clerk Dist. C~urt
Clea.rwater CAun ,Idaho (I

:lte: 9/16/2008

Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County

me: 03:37 PM

Minutes Report

3ge 1 of 1

User: RENEE

Case: CR-2005-0000561
Defendant: Lippert, Robert S
Selected Items

Hearing ,type:
Assigned judge:

Evidentiary Hearing, Continued
Carl B. Kerrick

Minutes date:

09/15/2008

Start time:

09:59 :'\M

Court reporter:

Linda Carlton

End time:

10:03 AM

Minutes clerk:

Renee' Robins

Audio tape number: CD#293-2

Prosecutor:
Lori M. Gilmore
Defense attorney: Peter C Jones
Tape Counter: 959

Tape Counter:
Tape Counter:
Tape Counter:
Tape Counter:
Tape Counter:
Tape Counter:
Tape Counter:
Tape Counter:
Tape Counter:

1001
1015
1043
1054
1056
1103
1105
1106
1111

Tape Counter: 1133
Tape Counter: 1152

Tape Counter: 1154

Court gives introductions, reviews proceedings held on 9/3/08 and the purpose of these
proceedings is to conduct an inquiry as to whether Mr. Lippert had good cause to request
a substitution of counsel on the 1st day of the jury trial.
Mr. Jones calls Robert Lippert, sworn in, testifies.
Cross-examination by Ms. Gilmore.
Re-direct by Mr. Jones.
Re-cross by Ms. Gilmore.
Court questions the witness.
Ms. Gilmore questions the witness in light of the Court's questions.
Mr. Jones questions the witness in light of the Court's questions.
Ms. Gilmore calls John Hathaway, sworn in, testifies.
Mr. Jones asks the Court have the witness identify the document he's referring to for his
testimony. Mr. Hathaway advises it is a breakdown of his contacts with Mr. Lippert. Ms.
Gilmore resumes questioning the witness.
Cross-examination by Mr. Jones.
Court questions the parties re: timeline for final briefing and responses and orders that Mr.
Jones' brief is due by 10/3/08, Ms. Gilmore'S response is due by 10/17/08 and Mr. Jones
will have 1 week to 10/24/08 to file any reply and the matter will be considered under
advisement on 10/24/08.
Court in recess.

Renee' Robins
Deputy Clerk

COURT MINUTES

&5'""'-

Approved:
District Judge

10/0212008 THU 16: 23
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PHELPS & ASSOCIATES, PS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
2903 North Stout
Spokane, WA 99206
Ph:(509)892-0467; Fax:(509)921-0802
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 0F-.tTImfiS...-__
' c:::~·::
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff
v.
ROBERT S. LIPPERT,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR-05-561
MEMORANDUM OF LAW

)

COMES NOW the above-entitled defendant, by and through his attorney of
record PETER JONES of PHELPS AND ASSOCIATES, P.S., and hereby presents the
following memorandum oflaw:

I. FACTS
.. The facts have largely been heard by this court. A brief summary follows:

Mr. Lippert was incarcerated in the Clearwater County Jail at all times
approaching his trial.

He was represented by Mr. Hathaway, an appointed public

defender, in pursuing this trial. Mr. Hathaway, on occasion, visited Mr. Lippert in the
jail, normally after a hearing took place. He would not visit beforehand, leaving Mr.
Lippert unprepared for the upcoming hearing.

Mr. Hathaway did visit Mr. Lippert before the trial in mid-January, but did not
speak to Mr. Lippert during that visit concerning the substance of the trial.

The

conversation revolved around the date of the trial and what Mr. Lippert would wear.

Memorandum pg 1 of7
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Prior to that, the last time Mr. Hathaway met with Mr. Lippert was following the 404(b)
hearing in this case, and again Mr. Hathaway did not speak to Mr. Lippert concerning the
substance of his case; rather Mr. Hathaway simply was "sure he knew" what was going
on with his case, having sat through the 404(b) hearing.

Mr. Lippert approached his trial without the advice of counsel, without any sort of
preparation, and without knowing the basic procedures of a trial.

He was of the

impression that Mr. Hathaway would prepare him, and thus did not ask for substitute
counsel until the day of trial; the only day on which Mr. Lippert could possibly know that

Mr. Hathaway did not intend to prepare his client for trial.

II. ISSUES
Per the appellate court's decision, there are four (4) issues for'this court to
consider in determining whether Mr. Lippert's request for an attorney was with good
cause:
. '1.

2.

Whether the defendant's motion for new counsel waS timely
Whether the trial court adequately inquired into defendant's reasons for

making the motion.
3.

Whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led to a total

lack of communication precluding an adequate defense; and
4.

Whether the defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the

communication breakdown.

.state v. Lippert, 181 P.3d 512 at 523 (ID 2007), citing United States v. Loft, 310
F.3d 1231,1250 (10th Cir.2002).

Memorandum pg 1 of 7
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m. ARGUMENT
1. The defendant's motion for new counsel was made at the only time he possibly .
could make it.
It is true that the defendant made his motion for new counsel on the day of trial.

It would be easy to leap to the conclusion that, because of this timing, Mr. Lippert's
request for new counsel was untimely.
To do that, however, overlooks the facts of the situation. Mr. Lippert was
consistently of the impression that Mr. Hathaway would, at some point before trial, go
over the trial with him. What Mr. Lippert needed most was communication from his
attorney about what to do in a trial situation; those of us who have done trials may feel
blase about them,. but we must never forget that, for our clients, it is a new and frightful
experience, and that one of the primary functions of being an attorney is guiding our
client through it.
It was not until the moment where Mr. Lippert was taken in front of the court and
told there was going to be a trial that Mr. Lippert had to come to grips with the fact that
his attorney was not going to communicate with him regarding the trial. As a result, Mr.
Lippert asked the court for a change of attorney.
At what other time could Mr. Lippert have made this motion? In order to make it,
he would have to predict that his attorney would completely fail to talk to him about the

trial in the weeks leading up to the trial. Mr. Lippert made the motion as soon

as he

figured out that Mr. Hathaway was not interested in preparing him for trial.. He knew that
Mr. Hathaway had a habit of not preparing him for trial, but he could not fathom (for it is
difficult to fathom) ~.fI.~0l1!~Y ~9t~peaking to hll,n about afelonyjury trial. ........._. ____.____ ..

Memorandum pg 1 of 7
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Even though it was made on the day of trial, Mr. Lippert's motion was made in as
timely a fashion as possible.
2. The court has now made a full inquiry.

Following its initial failure to inquire, this court has now, pursuant to the
instructions of the appellate court, made a full inquiry into Mr. Lippert's reason for
requesting a new attorney.
3. The defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of
communication precluding an adequate defense.

For evidence of this, we need turn no farther than the fact that Mr. Hathaway, in
the weeks leading up to the trial, did not prepare his client for trial in the least. The only
communication Mr. Hathaway had with Mr. Lippert was regarding the date of the trial,
and what Mr. Lippert should wear. There was no communication as to whether or not

Mr. Lippert should testify. There was no communication regarding what witnesses
would say what. Mr. Hathaway refused to come to the jail to speak to Mr. Lippert.
Once trial began, Mr. Lippert attempted to re-instate contact by passing notes to

. Mr. Hathaway. Mr. Hathaway and the state maintain that this note-passing was enough .
communication for an adequate defense, but it is hard to understand how one-way
communication from Mr. Lippert to Mr. Hathaway, with no communication back to Mr.
Lippert, could possibly be considered sufficient to provide an adequate defense.
There was a total lack of information flowing from Mr. Hathaway to Mr; Lippert,
and therefore any infolTIlation flowing from Mr. Lippert to Mr. Hathaway was
unconstrained by any knowledge or training with regard to the law. Mr. Hathaway

Memorandum pg 1 of?
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claimed on the stand that this was enough to provide an adequate defense, but given what
we know about the information flow, this cannot be true.
4. The defendant did not substantially and unreasonably contribute to the
communication breakdown.

Mr. Lippert was in the Clearwater County Jail. Communication happened at the
whim of Mr. Hathaway, who chose not to contact his client. Noone doubts that Mr.
Lippert is a little on the stubborn side, but this does not mean he contributed to a
communications breakdown.

In fact, Mr. Lippert tried constantly throughout these proceedings to continue to
communicate with Mr. Hathaway. He informed Mr. Hathaway of potential witnesses,
asked Mr. Hathaway questions, requested that Mr. Hathaway interview people to
. determine their usefulness as witnesses.

Mr. Lippert was constantly trying to

communicate with Mr. Hathaway; he was limited only by his jail cell.

Mr. Hathaway chose not to visit Mr. Lippert in the month before his trial. Mr.
. . ··Hathaway chose to restrict his conversation with Mr. Lippert just prior to trial to what

Mr. Lippert was going to wear. Mr. Hathaway chose to assume that Mr. Lippert knew
who was going to say what on the stand, and how that was going to be responded to.

In short, the testimony is clear that the blame for the communications breakdown.
between Mr. Hathaway and Mr. Lippert can be .laid squarely on Mr. Hathaway.

Memorandum pg 1 of7
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IV. CONCLUSION

Given that analysis on all of these points renders good cause for Mr. Lippert's
initial motion, that motion must be granted, and Mr. Lippert is entitled to a new trial as a
result.
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of October, 2008,

Attorney for Defendant

Memorandur:q.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true JWd COITec~\ foregoing to be
delivered via method indicated below on this _~_ day o f ·
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT S. LIPPERT,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR-2005-561

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This court is well aware of the facts that are at issue in the above-mentioned case.
However, the State will address the facts that are pertinent to the issues addressed in
memorandum.
1.

The defendant refused to dress or come to his trial on the morning of January 23,
2003. He stated that he was unprepared, had a headache and did not realize that the
trial had been scheduled on this date The defendant had received both written
notice and notice in open court of the trial date scheduled for January 23,2005.
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Mr. Lippert requested that other counsel be appointed for him.
The Court required Mr. Lippert to come to trial. The defendant did dress and come
to trial and participated in his defense by writing notes to his counsel, and
testifying on his own behalf The defendant was convicted and a sentencing date
was set.

2.

The defendant was not prepared for the sentencing and requested a continuance. He
also represented himself with assistance of his court appointed attorney, John R.
Hathaway. The defendant consulted with John Hathaway throughout the
sentencing hearing.

3.

The defendant was not prepared for the first hearing scheduled in this current
matter. He requested a continuance.

4.

In the hearing that was held on September 15, 2008, in this current matter the

defendant claims that his reasons for requesting substitute counsel were as follows:
- That the defendant had a conflict with Mr. Hathaway because of a previous
representation of a family member and because Mr. Hathaway had represented the
defendants business partner in a proceeding against him. During the hearing Mr.
Hathaway testified that he did not know the family member referred to by the
defendant and that he had never represented the defendant's business partner in any
actions against the defendant. In fact, Mr. Hathaway testified he did not know the
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defendant prior to his representation in this case.

-That the defendant did not know that he was going to trial on January 23,2005
and that Mr. Hathaway did not sufficiently prepare for that trial, and

- That there was a break down in communication between himself and Mr.
Hathaway.

5.

Mr. Hathaway testified at the hearing held on this matter to the following:
- That he had met with the defendant on 13 separate occasions during the
defendant's incarceration in the Clearwater County Jail. That during those
meetings Mr. Hathaway had provided discovery to the defendant and discussed that
discovery with him.
- That Mr. Hathaway had prepared and argued Motions in Limine and contested the
states proffer of 404 b evidence and cross examined several witnesses in a hearing
on that matter.
-That Mr. Hathaway discussed potential witnesses with the defendant, that he
interviewed witnesses, found witnesses and discussed the problems with their
potential testimony.
-That Mr. Hathaway had discussions with the defendant about whether or not the
defendant would testify on his own behalf and prepared him to do so.
-That the defendant and Mr. Hathaway communicated during the trial and that the
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defendant assisted Mr. Hathaway in his defense.
- Mr. Hathaway cross-examined the state's witnesses and put on a defense to the

charges.
-That Mr. Lippert consulted and communicated with Mr. Hathaway during the
sentencing hearing.

ISSUES

1.

Whether the defendant's motion for new counsel was timely;

·2.

Whether the trial court adequately inquired into defendant's reasons for making the
motion;

3.

Whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of
communication precluding an adequate defense; and

4.

Whether the defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the
communication break down.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether or not to appoint substitute counsel is within the sound discretion of the trial
judge. "The standard of review is an abuse of discretion standard, found when the denial of the
motion results in a violation of the defendant's right to counsel." State v. Priest 128 Idaho 6
(1995)
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LEGAL ARGUMENT

Defendant's Motion for New Counsel Was Not Timely
Mr. Lippert made the motion for new counsel that is being considered by this court on the
morning of trial. The state argues that this motion was meant to delay the trial and was untimely.

The Court Has Made an Inquiry Into the Defendant's Reasons for Requesting New Counsel
This court held a hearing on September 15, 2008, and conducted a full inquiry into the
issues addressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals regarding the Defendant's request for substitution
of Counsel.

The Defendant-Attorney Conflict Was Not so Great That it Led a Total Lack of
Communication
After this Court denied Mr. Lippert's motion for new counsel, the trial was conducted, as
scheduled. The defendant communicated with his attorney by notes and they spoke during breaks
from the trial. Jack Hathaway cross-examined the state's witnesses, made objections to the state's
questioning at trial and presented a defense, including calling the defendant as a witness.
The Idaho Court of appeals in its decision in this instant case, cited State v. Doe#l 272
F.3d 116, 123(2nd Cir.2001), which was a case that analyzed the four factors to be applied by this
court. The Doe court found that the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint
substitute counsel. Doe involved a defendant who had two previous attorneys. The defendant's
MEMORANDUM
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first attorney was appointed; the defendant then retained counsel who subsequently withdrew,
claiming that the defendant would not communicate with him. The trial court appointed a second
public defender. This public defender made two separate motions to withdraw as counsel. The
defendant made one pro se motion for new counsel and joined the defense attorney on one of the
motions to with withdraw. The trial court denied all of these motions. On the day of trial, defense
counsel requested that his client be shackled during the trial because the defendant had to be
restrained from hitting him the night before, the defendant had made a shooting gesture at the
attorney and the defendant had threatened the defendant's family.
The Doe court found that the attorney client relationship had not broken down to the point
as to prevent communication. Specifically the Court stated:
... While the rift between Findley and Stapleton was at times intense as a result of Findley's
violent and aggressive nature, the conflict between the two was not '" so great that it ...
resulted in total lack of communication preventing adequate defense. '" The record reveals
that Findley and Stapleton did communicate prior to and during the course of the trial.
Even after the district court repeatedly denied his withdrawal motions and after Stapleton
expressed fear for his own and his family's safety, Stapleton carried out his duties as
Findley's counsel by, for example, (1) filing no less than nine motions in limine'(2)
initially attempting to dissuade Findley from testifying, (3) arguing before the court once
Findley insisted on testifying, as to the admissibility of Findley's prior felony drug
conviction, (4) cross-examining witnesses, and (5) making numerous objections to the
government's questioning during the trial. Further, the district court credited Stapleton's
statements that he had given Findley the discovery provided by the government, met with
Findley to discuss strategy, and despite the conflict, was willing to continue representing
Findley during trial. Based on these facts, we cannot say that the conflict between Findley
and Stapleton prevented an adequate defense. Doe at 124

Given the relationship that existed in the Doe case, it is apparent that the attorney-client
relationship that existed in the case at bar between Mr. Hathaway and the defendant Mr. Lippert
did not rise to the standard that is required. Mr. Hathaway presented the defendant with discovery
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met with the defendant to go over the discovery, filed motions on behalf of the defendant,
discussed witnesses testimony and located and interviewed witnesses on behalf of the defendant,
discussed whether or not the defendant would testify on his own behalf. The defendant and Mr.
Hathaway communicated throughout the trial and the defendant, communicated with Mr.
Hathaway during the sentencing hearing. There was not a sufficient break down of
communication so as to deprive the defendant of counsel.

The Defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the communication break
Mr. Hathaway visited with the Defendant on thirteen separate occasions during the
defendant's incarceration with three ofthose visits occurring during the month preceding the trial.
Mr. Hathaway interviewed witnesses and discussed this with the defendant. Mr. Hathaway
testified that the defendant was very difficult to deal with and would not discuss anything except
that he did not do what was alleged. The Defendant's current counsel, in his memorandum
admits that "Mr. Lippert is a little on the stubborn side." Even this court has experienced the
defendant's proclivity to control situations. This court had to have the defendant brought into
court on the day of his trial because the defendant refused to come into the courtroom

Mr. Lippert, due to his controlling personality and behavior was the source of any breakdown in
communications.

Conclusion
It is within the sound discretion of this court to refuse the defendant's motion for new
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counsel and based on the preceding analysis it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
deny the defendant's motion

. ..-/

DATED this

;Lot'

day of October, 2008

~-Gtf};
~L
~
M. Gllfuore . .
Deputy Prosecutor
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
ROBERT S. LIPPERT,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 2005-561

:MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER ON REMAND
TO DETERMINE MOTION
FOR SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL

This matter came before the Court on remand from the Court of Appeals of the State of
Idaho. Peter Jones, of the fIrm Phelps & Associates, represented the Defendant, Robert S.
Lippert. The State ofIdaho was represented by Lori Gilmore, Clearwater County Chief Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney. A hearing was held on this matter on September 15,2008. Supplementary
briefs were filed by counsel in the weeks following the hearing. The Court, having heard the
argument of counsel and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision.

BACKGROUND
The Defendant, Robert Lippert, was charged with sexual abuse of a minor under the age
of sixteen, to which a jury found him guilty as charged. Mr. Lippert was represented by a public
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defender throughout the proceedings, until sentencing, at which time Lippert represented himself
with the same public defender available on standby.
At a pre-trial hearing on November 16,2005, Mr. Lippert requested that his public
defender be replaced by different court appointed counsel, and this court denied the request. I A
pretrial motion hearing was held on January 6,2006. During this hearing, the same appointed
counsel represented the Defendant and counsel effectively argued the motion in the matter, which
was of a complicated nature. During this time, there was a brief discussion between court and
counsel about a potential substitute public defender taking the case, however, a motion for
substitution of counsel was not considered at that time.
A jury trial on the matter was scheduled to begin on the morning of January 23, 2006. On
the morning of the day of trial, Mr. Lippert refused to exit his jail cell and was brought into the
courtroom by jail staff in his jail clothing because he had refused to change. Mr. Lippert claimed
he was unaware that the trial was scheduled for that day, and that he had an extreme headache.
Colloquy was held on the record between this Court and Mr. Lippert. At this time, Mr. Lippert
once again raised his concerns about counsel. While this Court allowed Mr. Lippert to express
his concerns on the record, the Court did not extensively question Mr. Lippert on his request for
new counsel. Having reviewed the matter, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to this Court

in order that a meaningful inquiry be held to determine whether Mr. Lippert possessed good
cause for his request for substitute counsel on the morning of the first day of trial.
A hearing on the issue of substitute counsel was originally scheduled for August 27,

2008. On that date, Mr. Lippert was not prepared to go forward on the matter, as he had lost his

1 The facts of this case show that Mr. Lippert requested substitute counsel on two occasions. The Court of Appeals
has directed this Court to consider only whether the defendant should have been granted substitute counsel when he
made the request on the morning of his trial.
2
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notes while in transit to Clearwater County. Mr. Lippert also informed the Court that counsel
would be representing him, but that counsel was not available immediately at the time of hearing.
The matter was then rescheduled for September 15,2008, at which time the Court conducted its
inquiry into Mr. Lippert's request for substitute counsel. During this inquiry Mr. Lippert took the
stand and was questioned by counsel and the court. Following Mr. Lippert's testimony, the
public defender took the stand and was questioned by counsel and the court.

ANALYSIS
This Court has been directed to conduct a meaningful inquiry to determine whether Mr.
Lippert possessed good cause for his request for substitute counsel on the morning of the first day
of trial. "Good cause includes an actual conflict of interest; a complete, irrevocable breakdown
of communication; or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict. State
v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 596-97, 181 P.3d 512,522-23 (Ct. App. 2007), citing Smith v.

Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing cases); McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927,
931 (2ndCir. 1981). See also UnitedStatesv. Loft, 310 F.3d 1231,1250 (10thCir. 2002). "If
good cause is shown, the defendant is constitutionally entitled to the appointment of new
counsel." ld., see State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960,964 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Further, "[i]n
evaluating good cause, a trial court should also consider whether the request for substitute
counsel was timely.,,2 State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 597,181 P.3d 512, 523 (Ct. App. 2007),

citing State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 277,61 P.3d 632,634 (Ct. App. 2002).

2 In State v. Reber, the Idaho Court of Appeals determined a motion for self-representation was timely if it is made
prior to the commencement of meaningful trial proceedings. ld at 277,61 P.3d at 634. Mr. Lippert's request for
substitute counsel came before the commencement of the trial in the case at hand, therefore the motion was timely.
Because the motion was timely made, this Court must determine whether Mr. Lippert set forth good cause for the
substitution of counsel.
3
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ON REMAND TO DETERMINE MOTION
FOR SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL

Based upon this Court's observation of the proceedings in this matter, and the inquiry
made by this Court and counsel at the hearing held on September, 15,2008, this Court
determines that Mr. Lippert did not have good cause for his request for substitute counsel on the
morning of the fIrst day of trial. This Court will address individually the aspects of good cause
as set forth by the Court of Appeals in State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho at 596, 181 P.3d at 522.

1. Did an actual conflict of interest exist between Lippert and his appointed counsel?
Good cause for a substitution of counsel may be established if an actual conflict of
interest existed between counsel and the defendant. The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct set
forth conflicts of interest in the practice of law in Rules 1.7 through 1.11. Rule 1. 7 (b) allows an
actual or potential conflict to be waived by the client. Conflicts of interest were discussed in
detail in State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 77 P.3d 124 (Ct. App. 2003).

"An actual or potential conflict cannot be waived if, in the circumstances
of the case, the conflict is of such a serious nature that no rational defendant
would knowingly and intelligently desire that attorney's representation. United
States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 95 (2nd Cir.2002). Conflicts can be divided into
those which implicate the attorneys own self-interest and those which implicate
the attorneys ethical obligation to someone other than the defendant, and the
former are often mote serious than the latter. See Schwarz, 283 F.3d at 96; United
States v. Fulton,S F.3d 605,609 (2nd Cir.1993).

Id. at 260, 77 P.3d at 128.
During this Court's inquiry regarding substitution of counsel, Mr. Lippert made reference
to two circumstances which may have created an actual conflict of interest between Mr. Lippert
and his appointed counsel. First, Mr. Lippert claimed that appointed counsel had represented Mr.
Lippert's aunt in her divorce during the early seventies and late eighties. 3 Appointed counsel

3 While testifying regarding his aunt, Mr. Lippert could not remember the exact time of her divorce proceedings and
instead gave a large window oftime when the divorce may have occurred. Regardless of the date, it appears the
divorce occurred prior to the time that appointed counsel began practicing law in Idaho.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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testified that he did not recognize the name of the aunt and that he did not begin the practice of
law in Idaho until 1987. Based upon this testimony, this Court is not convinced that an actual
conflict of interest existed regarding Mr. Lippert's aunt.

Mr. Lippert also alluded to a conflict of interest regarding appointed counsel's
representation of Mr. Lippert's former business partner. Mr. Lippert claimed that appointed
counsel represented this business partner in a property dispute against Mr. Lippert. LR.P.C.
1. 7(a)(I) prohibits representation of a client if "the representation of one client will be directly
adverse to another client. ... " LR.P.C. 17(a)(l). Appointed counsel did testify he had
represented the business partner with regard to a wage claim that loggers had made, but not in
any property issues. The representation happened sixteen or seventeen years in the past. Based
upon this representation, Mr. Lippert has not established that an actual conflict of interest existed
which prohibited appointed counsel from representing Mr. Lippert in the underlying criminal
matter. Thus, good cause for substitution of counsel has not been established based upon an
actual conflict of interest.

2. Was there a complete, irrevocable breakdown of communication between Lippert and
his appointed counsel?
This Court must consider whether a complete, irrevocable breakdown in communication
occurred between Mr. Lippert and appointed counsel, creating good cause for the substitution of
counsel on the first day of trial. Factors to be used in examining a total breakdown of
communication are set forth in United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231 (lOth Cir. 2002). See also
State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 597, 181 P.3d 512,523 (Ct. App. 2007). The Court must
consider:
1) whether the defendant's motion for new counsel was timely; 2) whether the
trial court adequately inquired into defendant's reasons for making the motion; 3)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ON REMAND TO DETERMINE MOTION
FOR SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL

5

whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of
communication precluding an adequate defense; and 4) whether the defendant
substantially and unreasonably contributed to the communication breakdown.
Id. at 1250. Whether the motion was timely4 and whether the trial court adequately inquired into

the defendant's reasons for making the motionS need not be considered in great detail. However,
in order to determine whether there was good cause for substitution of counsel, this Court must
consider the last two factors set forth in Lott; whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so
great that it led to a total lack of communication precluding an adequate defense and whether the
defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the communication breakdown. Each
issue will be addressed below.

a. Whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of
communication precluding an adequate defense.
Mr. Lippert claims that there was a total lack of communication which precluded him
from being provided an adequate defense at trial. First, Mr. Lippert argues that appointed
counsel failed to communicate with him prior to trial which resulted in Mr. Lippert being unable

The Idaho Court of Appeals considered whether a motion for self-representation was timely in State v. Reber, l38
Idaho 275, 61 P.3d 632 (Ct. App. 2002).
A motion for self-representation is timely if made prior to the commencement of meaningful trial
proceedings. Oakey, 853 F.2d at 553; Smith, 780 F.2d at 811; Fritz v. Spalding, 682 F.2d 782,
784 (9th Cir.1982). Empanelment of a jury is a meaningful trial proceeding; thus, a motion for
self-representation after jury empanelment is untimely. See Us. v. Schaff, 948 F.2d 501, 503 (9th
Cir.l991); Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir.1990); Smith, 780 F.2d at 811; Fritz, 682
F.2d at 784.
Id at 277,61 P.3d at 634. While inconvenient, this Court recognizes that Mr. Lippert's requests came prior to the
empanelment of a jury in the trial proceedings. A jury panel had been sununoned, and potential jurors were waiting
in the courthouse, but proceedings to empanel a jury had not begun at the time Mr. Lippert refused to exit his j ail
cell. Thus, this Court determines that Mr. Lippert's request was timely because it occurred prior to the
commencement of a meaningful trial proceeding. However, the timeliness of the motion, standing alone, does not
establish that there was good cause for substitution of counsel. Because the motion was timely, the Court must
consider the other factors set forth in Lott in order to determine whether there was good cause for the substitution of
counsel in the case at hand.
S The second factor set forth in Lou is whether the trial court adequately inquired into defendant's reasons for
making the motion for substitute counsel. Lott, 310 F.3d at 1250. As required by the Court of Appeals, a hearing
was held to conduct a meaningful inquiry to determine whether Lippert possessed good cause for his request for
substitute counsel. At this hearing, Mr. Lippert was provided the opportunity to present his reasons for requesting
counsel, accordingly, it is not necessary for this Court to address the second factor from Lott in detail.
6
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to determine whether he should testify, or being aware of the information witnesses would
provide in their testimony.6 Mr. Lippert asserts that appointed counsel refused to come to the jail
to speak with him. Finally, Mr. Lippert asserted that his only communication with appointed
counsel was via note-passing during the trial, which was one-way communication at best.
"The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that he has a genuine irreconcilable
conflict with counselor that there has been a total breakdown in communications." State v.

Torres, 208 Ariz. 340, 343, 93 P.3d 1056, 1059 (2004). Guidance on whether a total breakdown
in communication occurred between a defendant and appointed counsel can also be found in

United States v. Lott, 310 U.S. 1231 (lOth Cir. 2002).
[A hearing helps] a court determine whether an attorney-client conflict rises to the
level of a ''total breakdown in communication" or instead whether the conflict is
insubstantial or a mere "disagreement about trial strategy [that] does not require
substitution of counsel." United States v. Taylor, 128 F.3d 1105, 1110 (7th
Cir.1997). The types of communication breakdowns that constitute "total
breakdowns" defy easy defInition, and to our knowledge no court or commentator
has put forth a precise defInition. As a general matter, however, we believe that to
prove a total breakdown in communication, a defendant must put forth evidence
of a severe and pervasive conflict with his attorney or evidence that he had such
minimal contact with the attorney that meaningful communication was not
possible.

Id. at 1249.
An example of a situation which may have created in a total breakdown in

communication is discussed in United States v. John Doe #1,272 F.3d 116 (2nd Cir. 2001). In
this case, the Court determined that a total breakdown in communication had not occurred, even
though court appointed counsel had initially motioned to withdraw based upon his concerns of
threats made by his client. The trial court in John Doe initially denied the motion to withdraw,

While Mr. Lippert claims to not be aware of the potential testimony of witnesses, many of these witnesses testified
at the pretrial hearing regarding LR.E. 404(b) evidence. Mr. Lippert was in attendance with counsel at this hearing.
7
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but as the time for trial grew near, the trial court held a hearing on the Defendant's pro se motion
for substitution of counsel.
Findley submitted a pro se motion to relieve Stapleton as trial counsel alleging
that Stapleton harbored bad faith and failed to discuss defense strategies with
Findley. The district court held a hearing on Findley's motion, during which
Findley argued that there was a "conflict of interest" between him and Stapleton
because Stapleton had repeatedly lied to him. In response, Stapleton indicated that
he had had no communication with Findley since Findley's last appearance in
court. Stapleton further stated that he had provided Findley with all discovery
(which Findley disputed) and had given Findley a "candid estimation" of how the
trial would proceed and end. Stapleton also described Findley's aggressiveness
toward him, but expressed his willingness to continue to represent Findley, since
he believed that Findley would act similarly with any other attorney.

Id. at 120-21. Defendant Findley had made threats of physical violence to both counsel and his
family in the past. Based -upon the hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant's motion. Upon
review, the trial court's determination was upheld, based upon the following reasoning:
[W]hile the rift between Findley and Stapleton was at times intense as a result of
Findley's violent and aggressive nature, the conflict between the two was not" 'so
great that it ... resulted in total lack of communication preventing an adequate
defense.' " Simeonov, 252 F.3d at 241 (quoting Morrissey, 461 F.2d at 670). The
record reveals that Findley and Stapleton did communicate prior to and during the
course of the trial. Even after the district court repeatedly denied his withdrawal
motions and after Stapleton expressed fear for his own and his family's safety,
Stapleton carried out his duties as Findley's counsel by, for example, (l) filing no
less than nine motions in limine; (2) initially attempting to dissuade Findley from
testifying, (3) arguing before the court, once Findley insisted on testifying, as to
the admissibility of Findley's prior felony drug conviction, (4) cross-examining
witnesses, and (5) making numerous objections to the government's questioning
during the trial. Despite the conflict between Findley and Stapleton, it is clear that
the two communicated in presenting Findley's defense. Further, the district court
credited Stapleton's statements that he had given Findley the discovery provided
by the Government, met with Findley to discuss strategy, and, despite the conflict,
was willing to continue representing Findley during trial. Based on these facts, we
cannot say that the conflict between Findley and Stapleton prevented an adequate
defense.
[d. at 124.
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The rift between counsel and the defendant in John Doe was of a more tumultuous nature
than the rift between counsel and Mr. Lippert in the case at hand. Even so, the John Doe Court
determined that a total breakdown in communication had not occurred.
The case at hand is also similar to McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927 (2nd Cir. 1981),
another case where the reviewing court upheld the trial court's determination that substitution of
counsel was not warranted. The McKee Court determined that the defendant's arguments that a
fundamental disruption of the integrity of the attorney-client relationship did not rise to the level
of a total breakdown in communication.
The grounds that McKee raised for substitution of counsel were that Occhetti had
"prejudged" him and informed him that his chances of acquittal were slim. In
addition, McKee suggests that Occhetti actually discussed with the prosecutor the
fact of McKee's guilt. McKee argues that, regardless of whether these allegations
are true, the resulting loss of trust wrought a "fundamental disruption of the
integrity of the attorney-client relationship." Appellant's Br. at 8. Thus, the
argument goes, there was a "complete breakdown in communication" which
warranted the eleventh-hour substitution, despite the potential for delay and
disruption of the ongoing trial. We find these contentions to be merit1ess.

ld at 931 -9321. 7 Similar complaints were made by Mr. Lippert in the case before this Court.
Based upon the hearing held on this matter, this Court is not persuaded that the Defendant has
met his burden of establishing that a total breal(down of communication occurred between
himself and appointed counsel.
At the hearing on this matter, Mr. Lippert testified regarding whether there was a total
breakdown of communication between himself and appointed counsel. Mr. Lippert claimed he
wrote several notes to counsel over a period of six months, but that counsel failed to reply to any

A comprehensive list of cases of a similar nature, involving the total breakdown of communication between a client
and appointed counsel is available at H.D. W., Annotation, Right ofDefendant in Criminal Case to Discharge of or
Substitution of Other Counsel for, Attorney Appointed by Court to Represent Him, 157 A.L.R. 1225 (originally
printed in 1945, updated weekly).
9
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ON REMAND TO DETERMINE MOTION
FOR SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL
7

of the questions posed in the notes. :Mr. Lippert also claims he never received assistance to
research laws. :Mr. Lippert claimed that counsel failed to prepare him for trial, and that he was
not informed even of the actual date of trial. 8 :Mr. Lippert also claimed that he did not know prior
to trial that he would be called to testify, and that it was his belief that the Court coerced him into
testifying. Mr. Lippert also claimed that key witnesses were not called at the trial. Mr. Lippert
did admit, during the recent hearing, that appointed counsel did visit him at the jail, usually after
a hearing had taken place in court.
Appointed counsel also testified at the hearing, first explaining procedural matters that
happened during the course of the proceedings which led to trial. Appointed counsel explained
the process of disqualifying the judge originally assigned to the case. Next, appointed counsel
explained that he was appointed to represent :Mr. Lippert in several matters, not just the charges
that were tried in this case at hand. Several warrants were issued on these other matters, and
charges on other issues were dismissed because the statute of limitations had expired. Appointed
counsel testified that he spoke with the Defendant prior to and after the preliminary hearing. He
provided the Defendant with all the information that had been obtained in discovery. Appointed
counsel filed motions in limine on behalf of the Defendant and participated in complex pretrial
hearings on these motions. Appointed counsel tracked down two witnesses from out of state at
the request of the Defendant, however, he elected to not subpoena these witnesses after the
Defendant claimed they would just lie about the situation anyway. Appointed counsel explained
that Mr. Lippert was difficult to communicate with because he claimed the victim in the case was
just lying about what had happened. Appointed counsel did claim that communication had

8 While Mr. Lippert claimed to be unaware of the actual date of triaL he was present in Court during all pretrial
proceedings, and the date of the trial was stated during these proceedings, therefore this argument does not support
Mr. Lippert's claims that appointed counsel failed to communicate with him.
.
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broken down following the pretrial motion hearing regarding I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, but even so,
counsel had visited Defendant prior to the trial and that Defendant was aware of the trial date.
He also discussed with Mr. Lippert his right to not testify at trial, and communicated with the
Defendant at trial after he elected to testify. Appointed counsel provided an adequate defense at
trial, providing opening and closing statements, cross-examination of witnesses, presentation of
witnesses on Mr. Lippert's behalf, and made appropriate objections during testimony.
Considering the matter in total, this Court is not convinced that there was a total
breakdown of communication between Mr. Lippert and appointed counsel. Mr. Lippert failed to
provide evidence of a severe or pervasive conflict with counsel, nor did he establish that he had
such minimal contact that meaningful communication was not possible. Therefore, good cause
for the motion for substitution of counsel has not been established on the basis that there was a
total breakdown of communication.

b. Whether the defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the
communication breakdown.
This Court has determined that there was not a total breakdown of communication
between Mr. Lippert and appointed counsel which precluded an adequate defense at trial.
However, in order to provide a complete analysis, this Court will discuss whether the defendant
substantially and unreasonably contributed to any communication brealcdown that may have
occurred between himself and appointed counsel, based upon the factors provided in United
States v. Lott, 310 F .3d at 1250.

If a defendant requests substitution of counsel, he may not rely on his own actions to
establish good cause for the motion. "A defendant may not, however, manufacture good cause
by abusive or uncooperative behavior." State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 597, 181 P.3d 512, 523
:MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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(Ct. App. 2007), citing United States v. John Doe #1, 272 F.3d at 123. Several cases address the
impact of a defendant's own actions with regard to whether substitute counsel should be
appointed. See Tuitt v. Fair, 882 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1987)(1ast minute request to substitute
counsel should not be allowed to become a vehicle for achieving delay); United States v.

Andrews, 754 F.Supp. 1195 (N.D. Ill. 1990)(disagreements between appointed counsel and
defendant over trial strategy and impetuous relationship do not amount to a conflict necessitating
substitution); United States v. Birrell, 286 F.Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v.

Morsley, 64 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1995).9 Further, the Defendant's last minute request for
substitution of counsel should not be allowed to become a vehicle for achieving delay.

A defendant's belated request for substitution of counsel is granted only where
there exists "good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of
communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust
verdict." McKee, 649 F.2d at 931 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
See also Schmidt, 105 F .3d at 89 ("On the eve of trial, just as during trial, a
defendant can only substitute new counsel when unusual circumstances are found
to exist, such as·a complete breakdown of communication or an irreconcilable
conflict"); United States v. Llanes, 374 F.2d 712, 717 (2d Cir.1967) ("Judges must
be vigilant that requests for appointment of a new attorney on the eve of trial
should not become a vehicle for achieving delay"). Although a defendant's "loss
of trust" should be considered when assessing whether good cause for the
substitution of assigned counsel exists, the defendant "must nevertheless afford
the court with legitimate reasons for the lack of confidence." McKee, 649 F.2d at
932.

Latterell v. Conway, 430 F.Supp.2d 116, 123 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).
In the case at hand, Mr. Lippert substantially contributed to the breakdown in
communication between himself and counsel, and his request for substitution of counsel made on
the morning of trial was simply a tactic for delaying the trial proceedings. This Court finds that

Mr. Lippert's actions did not rise to the level of egregious, threatening, abusive and

9 A comprehensive list of similar cases is located at 157 A.L.R. 1225.
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uncooperative behavior as compared to the defendant in United States v. John Doe #1, 272 F.3d
116 (2nd Cir. 2001), which was discussed in detail above. Nonetheless, Mr. Lippert failed to

engage in meaningful communication with appointed counsel in a manner to best aid in his
defense. Appointed counsel stated that Mr. Lippert was difficult to deal with and would not
discuss the case in more detail than to state that he did not do what was alleged or express his
beliefs that the victim and witnesses were lying. Counsel tracked down two witnesses at Mr.
Lippert's request, but once they were located Mr. Lippert decided they would lie about the facts
surrounding the charges against him. Even though Mr. Lippert complained that appointed
counsel would not visit him at the jail, Mr. Lippert did concede that appointed counsel had come
to the jail after hearings. Based upon this Court's own observations and the testimony provided
at the recent hearing, this Court is not persuaded that the fault for a possible lack of
communication should be laid squarely on appointed counsel alone, but that Mr. Lippert
substantially contributed to any breakdown of communication by his own actions.
Having reviewed the factors set out in United States v. Lott, this Court is unpersuaded
that a complete, irrevocable breakdown of communication occurred in the case at hand, thus,
good cause for substitution of counsel on the morning of trial was not established. The Court
finds that while communication between appointed counsel and Mr. Lippert was difficult, it had
not irretrievably and completely broken down to the point that Mr. Lippert could not aid in his
own defense. Further, Mr. Lippert substantially contributed to the difficulty of communicating
through his own actions. Therefore, the Defendant has not established good cause for the motion
for substitution of counsel on the morning of trial.
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3. Did an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict exist in this
matter?
Lastly, good cause for the substitution of counsel may be established if an irreconcilable
conflict leads to an apparently unjust verdict. This issue was not argued by the Defendant in
briefing, nevertheless, the Court will address this issue in determining whether good cause
existed for the substitution of counsel in this case. An irreconcilable conflict which lead to an
apparently unjust verdict was discussed in Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970). In
this case, a dispute arose almost immediately between the defendant and his assigned counsel.
The defendant filed four motions for substitution of counsel, all of which were denied by the trial
court without inquiry. ld. at 1169. The defendant "was forced into a trial with the assistance of a
particular lawyer with whom he was dissatisfied, with whom he would not cooperate, and with
whom he would not, in any manner whatsoever, communicate." ld. The reviewing court
determined that the attorney was understandably deprived of the power to present an adequate
defense on the defendant's behalf due to the complete lack of communication. ld. The
defendant was found guilty by jury of first degree murder, and the trial judge promptly reduced
the offense to murder in the second degree. ld. The reviewing court found, however, that it was
"not unreasonable to believe that had Brown been represented by counsel in whom he had
confidence he would have been convicted, if at all, of no more than the offense of manslaughter."
fd. at 1170. Clearly, in Brown v. Craven, the irreconcilable conflict between counsel and the

defendant resulted in an unjust verdict of first degree murder.

In the case at hand, there is no suggestion that the verdict reached was an unjust verdict.
This case is distinguishable from Brown. First, in Brown, there was no communication in any
manner between counsel and client almost immediately, as a result of a conflict that occurred
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shortly after counsel's appointment to the case. The same cannot be said in the case at hand.
Further, it was clear that the trial judge in Brown was convinced immediately that an unjust
verdict had been reached by the jury, and the trial judge promptly reduced the verdict to murder
in the second degree. 10 There is no such disparity in the verdict determined by the jury in the
case before this Court. Therefore, good cause for substitution of counsel cannot be based upon
an argument that there was an irreconcilable conflict which led to an apparently unjust verdict.
This Court has reviewed whether Mr. Lippert possessed good cause for his request for
substitute counsel on the morning of the first day of trial. The Court has considered, first,
whether there was an actual conflict of interest; second, whether there was a complete,
irrevocable breakdown of communication; and third, whether there was an irreconcilable conflict
which lead to an apparently unjust verdict. Finding good cause absent, this Court determines that
a substitution of counsel was not warranted on the morning of the first day of triaL

CONCLUSION
On remand, this Court was required to conduct a meaningful inquiry to determine
whether Mr. Lippert possessed good cause for his request for substitute counsel on the morning
of the first day of his criminal trial. A hearing was held on the matter and briefs were submitted

in the weeks following the hearing. This Court reviewed whether good cause was established
based on whether there was an actual conflict of interest; whether there was a complete
irrevocable breakdown of communication; or whether there was an irreconcilable conflict which

10 The Brown Court reversed judgment and remanded for a new trial. The trial court was directed to "grant Brown a
new trial attended with all reasonable assurance that he be represented by competent counsel, from the Public
Defender's office or elsewhere, in whom he may, ifhe does not demonstrate obstinance, recalcitrance, or
unreasonable contumacy, repose his confidence." Id. at 1170.
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lead to an apparently unjust verdict. For the foregoing reasons, this Court determines that good
cause did not exist for the substitution of counsel.

ORDER
On remand, it is determined that the Defendant's Motion for Substitution of Counsel is
hereby DENIED.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED.

Dated this ~&Jay of November 2008.

CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge
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STATE OF IDAHO,
Petitioner,

v.
ROBERT S. LIPPERT,
Respondent.

CASE NO. CR 2005-561
ORDER VACATING AND
REENTERING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER ON REMAND
TO DETERMINE MOTION
FOR SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL

Based on the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions oflaw, and Order on Petition
for Post Conviction Relief in Clearwater County case number CV09-00 194 the Court
hereby orders that the Memorandum Opinion and Order on Remand to Determine Motion
for Substitute Counsel be VACATED and REENTERED.
This matter came before the Court on remand from the Court of Appeals of the
State ofIdaho. Peter Jones, of the fIrm Phelps & Associates, represented the Defendant,
Robert S. Lippert. The State of Idaho was represented by Lori Gilmore, Clearwater
County Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attorney. A hearing was held on this matter on
September 15, 2008. Supplementary briefs were fIled by counsel in the weeks following
the hearing. The Court, having head the argument of counsel and being fully advised in
the matter, hereby renders its decision.

BACKGROUND
The Defendant, Robert Lippert, was charged with sexual abuse of a minor under
the age of sixteen, to which ajury found him guilty as charged. Mr. Lippert was
represented by a public
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defender throughout the proceedings, until sentencing, at which time Lippert represented himself

with the same public defender available on standby.
At a pre-trial hearing on November 16, 2005, Mr. Lippert requested that his public
defender be replaced by different court appointed counsel, and this court denied the request.! A
pretrial motion hearing was held on January 6,2006. During this hearing, the same appointed
counsel represented the Defendant and counsel effectively argued the motion in the matter, which

was of a complicated nature. During this time, there was a brief discussion between court and
counsel about a potential substitute public defender taking the case, however, a motion for
substitution of counsel was not considered at that time.
A jury trial on the matter was scheduled to begin on the morning of January 23,2006. On
the morning of the day of trial, Mr. Lippert refused to exit his jail cell and was brought into the
courtroom by jail staff in his jail clothing because he had refused to change. Mr. Lippert claimed
he was unaware that the trial was scheduled for that day, and that he had an extreme headache.
Colloquy was held on the record between this Court and Mr. Lippert. At this time, Mr. Lippert
once again raised his concerns about counsel. While this Court allowed Mr. Lippert to express
his concerns on the record, the Court did not extensively question Mr. Lippert on his request for
n~w

counsel. Having reviewed the matter, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to this Court

in order that a meaningful inquiry be held to determine whether Mr. Lippert possessed good
cause for his request for substitute counsel on the morning of the fIrst day of trial.
A hearing on the issue of substitute counsel was originally scheduled for August 27,
2008. On that date, Mr. Lippert was not prepared to go forward on the matter, as he had lost his

1 The facts of this case show that:Mr. Lippert requested substitute counsel on two occasions. The Court of Appeals
has directed this Court to consider only whether the defendant should have been granted substitute counsel when he
made the request on the morning of his trial.
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Dotes while in transit to Clearwater County. Mr. Lippert also informed the Court that counsel
would be representing him, but that counsel was not available immediately at the time of hearing.
The matter was then rescheduled for September 15,2008, at which time the Court conducted its
inquiry into Mr. Lippert's request for substitute counsel. During this inquiry Mr. Lippert took the
stand and was questioned by counsel and the court. Following Mr. Lippert's testimony, the
public defender took the stand and was questioned by counsel and the court.

ANALYSIS
1bis Court has been directed to conduct a meaningful inquiry to determine whether Mr.
Lippert possessed good cause for his request for substitute counsel on the morning of the first day
of trial. "Good cause includes an actual conflict of interest; a complete, irrevocable breakdown
of communication; or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict. State
v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 596-97, 181 P.3d 512, 522-23 (Ct. App. 2007), citing Smith v.

Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing cases); McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927,
931 (2nd Cir. 1981). See also United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231,1250 (lOth Cir. 2002). "If
good cause is shown, the defendant is constitutionally entitled to the appointment of new
counsel." fd., see State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960,964 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Further, "[i]n
evaluating good cause, a trial court should also consider whether the request for substitute
counsel was timely.,,2 State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 597, 181 P.3d 512,523 (Ct. App. 2007),

citing State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 277, 61 P.3d 632,634 (Ct. App. 2002).

2 In State v. Reber, the Idaho Court of Appeals determined a motion for self-representation was timely if it is made
prior to the commencement of meaningful trial proceedings. Jd. at 277,61 P.3d at 634. Mr. Lippert's request for
substitute counsel came before the commencement of the trial in the case at hand, therefore the motion was timely.
Because the motion was timely made, this Court must determine whether Mr. Lippert set forth good cause for the
substitution of counsel.
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Based upon this Court's observation of the proceedings in this matter, and the inquiry
made by this Court and counsel at the hearing held on September, 15,2008, this Court
determines that Mr. Lippert did not have good cause for his request for substitute counsel on the
morning of the fIrst day of trial. This Court will address individually the aspects of good cause
as set forth by the Court of Appeals in State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho at 596, 181 P.3d at 522.

1. Did an actual conflict of interest exist between Lippert and his appointed counsel?
Good cause for a substitution of counsel may be established if an actual conflict of
interest existed between counsel and the defendant. The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct set
forth conflicts of interest in the practice of law in Rules 1.7 through 1.11. Rule 1.7 (b) allows an

actual or potential conflict to be waived by the client. Conflicts of interest were discussed in
detail in State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 77 P.3d 124 (Ct. App. 2003).

"An actual or potential conflict cannot be waived if, in the circumstances
of the case, the conflict is of such a serious nature that no rational defendant
would knowingly and intelligently desire that attorney's representation. United
States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76,95 (2nd Cir.2002). Conflicts can be divided into
those which implicate the attorneys own self-interest and those which implicate
the attorneys ethical obligation to someone other than the defendant, and the
former are often more serious than the latter. See Schwarz, 283 F.3d at 96; United
States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 609 (2nd Cir.1993).

Id. at 260, 77 P.3d at 128.
During this Court's inquiry regarding substitution of counsel, Mr. Lippert made reference
to two circumstances which may have created an actual conflict of interest between Mr. Lippert
and his appointed counsel. First, Mr. Lippert claimed that appointed counsel had represented Mr.
Lippert's aunt in her divorce during the early seventies and late eighties. 3 Appointed counsel

While testifying regarding his aunt, Mr. Lippert could not remember the exact time of her divorce proceedings and
instead gave a large window oftime when the divorce may have occurred. Regardless of the date, it appears the
divorce occurred prior to the time that appointed counsel began practicing law in Idaho.
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testified that he did not recognize the name of the aunt and that he did not begin the practice of
law in Idaho until 1987. Based upon this testimony, this Court is not convinced that an actual
conflict of interest existed regarding Mr. Lippert's aunt.

Mr. Lippert also alluded tci a conflict of interest regarding appointed counsel's
representation of Mr. Lippert's former business partner. Mr. Lippert claimed that appointed
counsel represented this business partner in a property dispute against Mr. Lippert. LR.P.C.
1.7(a)(1) prohibits representation of a client if "the representation of one client will be directly
adverse to another client. ... " LR.P.C. 17(a)(1). Appointed counsel did testify he had
represented the business partner with regard to a wage claim that loggers had made, but not in
any property issues. The representation happened sixteen or seventeen years in the past. Based

upon this representation, Mr. Lippert has not established that an actual conflict of interest existed
which prohibited appointed counsel from representing Mr. Lippert in the underlying criminal
matter. Thus, good cause for substitution of counsel has not been established based upon an
actual conflict of interest.

2. Was there a complete, irrevocable breakdown of communication between Lippert and
his appointed counsel?
This Court must consider whether a complete, irrevocable breakdown in communication
occurred between Mr. Lippert and appointed counsel, creating good cause for the substitution of
counsel on the first day of trial. Factors to be used in examining a total breakdown of
communication are set forth in United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2002). See also
State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586,597,181 P.3d 512, 523 (Ct. App. 2007). The Court must

consider:
1) whether the defendant's motion for new counsel was timely; 2) whether the
trial court adequately inquired into defendant's reasons for making the motion; 3)
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whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of
communication precluding an adequate defense; and 4) whether the defendant
substantially and unreasonably contributed to the communication breakdown.

Id. at 1250. Whether the motion was timely4 and whether the trial court adequately inquired into
the defendant's reasons for making the motions need not be considered in great detail. However,
in order to determine whether there was good cause for substitution of counsel, this COUlt must
consider the last two factors set forth in Lott; whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so
great that it led to a total lack of communication precluding an adequate defense and whether the
defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the communication breakdown. Each
issue will be addressed below.

a. Whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of
communication precluding an adequate defense.
Mr. Lippert claims that there was a total lack of communication which precluded him
from being provided an adequate defense at trial. First, Mr. Lippert argues that appointed
counsel failed to communicate with him prior to trial which resulted in Mr. Lippert being unable

4 The Idaho Court of Appeals considered whether a motion for self-representation was timely in State v. Reber, 138
Idaho 275,61 P.3d 632 (Ct. App. 2002).
A motion for self-representation is timely if made prior to the commencement of meaningful trial
proceedings. Oakey, 853 F.2d at 553; Smith, 780 F.2d at 811; Fritz v. Spalding, 682 F.2d 782,
784 (9th Cir.1982). Empanelment of a jury is a meaningful trial proceeding; thus, a motion for
self-representation after jury empanelment is untimely. See US. v. Schaff, 948 F.2d 501, 503 (9th
Cir.1991); Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882,888 (9th Cir.1990); Smith 780 F.2d at 811; Fritz, 682
F.2d at 784.
Id at 277,61 P.3d at 634. While inconvenient, this Court recognizes that Mr. Lippert's requests came prior to the
empanelment of a jury in the trial proceedings. A jury panel had been summoned, and potential jurors were waiting
in the courthouse, but proceedings to empanel a jury had not begun at the time :Mr. Lippert refused to exit his jail
cell. Thus, this Court determines that:Mr. Lippert's request was timely because it occurred prior to the
commencement of a meaningful trial proceeding. However, the timeliness of the motion, standing alone, does not
establish that there was good cause for substitution of counsel. Because the motion was timely, the Court must
consider the other factors set forth in Lott in order to determine whether there was good cause for the substitution of
counsel in the case at hand.
5 The second factor set forth in Lott is whether the trial court adequately inquired into defendant's reasons for
making the motion for substitute counsel. Lott, 310 F.3d at 1250. As required by the Court of Appeals, a hearing
was held to conduct a meaningful inquiry to determine whether Lippert possessed good cause for his request for
substitute counsel. At this hearing, :Mr. Lippert was provided the opportunity to present his reasons for requesting
counsel, accordingly, it is not necessary for this Court to address the second factor from Lott in detail.
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to determine whether he should testify, or being aware of the information witnesses would
provide in their testimony.6 Mr. Lippert asserts that appointed counsel refused to come to the jail
to speak with him. Finally, Mr. Lippert asserted that his only communication with appointed
counsel was via note-passing during the trial, which was one-way communication at best.
"The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that he has a genuine irreconcilable
conflict with counselor that there has been a total breakdown in communications." State v.

Torres, 208 Ariz. 340,343,93 P.3d 1056, 1059 (2004). Guidance on whether a total breakdown
in communication occurred between a defendant and appointed counsel can also be found in

United States v. Lott, 310 U.S. 1231 (10th Cir. 2002).
[A hearing helps] a court determine whether an attorney-client conflict rises to the
level of a "total breakdown in communication" or instead whether the conflict is
insubstantial or a mere "disagreement about trial strategy [that] does not require
substitution of counsel." United States v. Taylor, 128 F.3d 1105, 1110 (7th
Cir.l997). The types of communication breakdowns that constitute "total
breakdowns" defy easy definition, and to our knowledge no court or commentator
has put forth a precise definition. As a general matter, however, we believe that to
prove a total breakdown in communication, a defendant must put forth evidence
of a severe and pervasive conflict with his attorney or evidence that he had such
minimal contact with the attorney that meaningful communication was not
possible.

Id. at 1249.
An example of a situation which may have created in a total breakdown in
communication is discussed in United States v. John Doe #1,272 F.3d 116 (2nd Cir. 2001). In
this case, the Court determined that a total breakdown in communication had not occurred, even
though court appointed counsel had initially motioned to withdraw based upon his concerns of
threats made by his client. The trial court in John Doe initially denied the motion to withdraw,

6 While Mr. Lippert claims to not be aware of the potential testimony of witnesses, many of these witnesses testified
at the pretrial hearing regarding LR..E. 404(b) evidence. Mr. Lippert was in attendance with counsel at this hearing.
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but as the time for trial grew near, the trial court held a hearing on the Defendant's pro se motion
for substitution of counsel.
Findley submitted a pro se motion to relieve Stapleton as trial counsel alleging
that Stapleton harbored bad faith and failed to discuss defense strategies with
Findley. The district court held a hearing on Findley's motion, during which
Findley argued that there was a "conflict of interest" between him and Stapleton
because Stapleton had repeatedly lied to him. In response, Stapleton indicated that
he had had no communication with Findley since Findley's last appearance in
court. Stapleton further stated that he had provided Findley with all discovery
(which Findley disputed) and had given Findley a "candid estimation" of how the
trial would proceed and end. Stapleton also described Findley's aggressiveness
toward him, but expressed his willingness to continue to represent Findley, since
he believed that Findley would act siniilarly with any other attorney.

I d. at 120-21. Defendant Findley had made threats of physical violence to both counsel and his
family in the past. Based upon the hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant's motion. Upon
review, the trial court's determination was upheld, based upon the following reasoning:
[WJhile the rift between Findley and Stapleton was at times intense as a result of
Findley's violent and aggressive nature, the conflict between the two was not" 'so·
great that it ... resulted in total lack of communication preventing an adequate
defense.' " Simeonov, 252 F.3d at 241 (quoting Morrissey, 461 F.2d at 670). The
record reveals that Findley and Stapleton did communicate prior to and during the
course of the trial. Even after the district court repeatedly denied his withdrawal
motions and after Stapleton expressed fear for his own and his family's safety,
Stapleton carried out his duties as Findley's counsel by, for example, (1) filing no
less than nine motions in limine; (2) initially attempting to dissuade Findley from
. testifying, (3) arguing before the court, once Findley insisted on testifying, as to
the admissibility of Findley's prior felony drug conviction, (4) cross-examining
witnesses, and (5) making numerous objections to the government's questioning
during the trial. Despite the conflict between Findley and Stapleton, it is clear that
the two communicated in presenting Findley's defense. Further, the district court
credited Stapleton's statements that he had given Findley the discovery provided
by the Government, met with Findley to discuss strategy, and, despite the conflict,
was willing to continue representing Findley during trial. Based on these facts, we
cannot say that the conflict between Findley and Stapleton prevented an adequate
defense.

Id. at 124.
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The rift between counsel and the defendant in John Doe was of a more tumultuous nature
~,

than the rift between counsel and MI. Lippert in the case at hand. Even so, the John Doe Court
determined that a total breakdown in communication had not occurred.
The case at hand is also similar to McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927 (2nd Cir. 1981),
another case where the reviewing court upheld the trial court's determination that substitution of
counsel was not warranted. The McKee Court determined that the defendant's arguments that a
fundamental disruption of the integrity of the attorney-client relationship did not rise to the level
of a total breakdown in communication.
The grounds that McKee raised for substitution of counsel were that Occhetti had
"prejudged" him and informed him that his chances of acquittal were slim. In
addition, McKee suggests that Occhetti actually discussed with the prosecutor the
fact of McKee's guilt. McKee argues that, regardless of whether these allegations
are true, the resulting loss of trust wrought a "fundamental disruption of the
integrity of the attorney-client relationship." Appellant's Br. at 8. Thus, the
argument goes, there was a "complete brealcdown in communication" which
warranted the eleventh-hour substitution, despite the potential for delay and
disruption of the ongoing trial. We find these contentions to be meritless.

Id. at 931 -9321. 7 Similar complaints were made by MI. Lippert in the case before this Court.
Based upon the hearing held on this matter, this Court is not persuaded that the Defendant has
met his burden of establishing that a total brealcdown of communication occurred between
himself and appointed counsel.
At the hearing on this matter, MI. Lippert testified regarding whether there was a total
breakdown of communication between himself and appointed counsel. MI. Lippert claimed he
wrote several notes to counsel over a period of six months, but that counsel failed to reply to any

7 A comprehensive list of cases of a similar nature, involving the total breakdown of communication between a client
and appointed counsel is available at H.D.W., Annotation, Right ofDefendant in Criminal Case to Discharge of or
Substitution of Other Counsel for, Attorney Appointed by Court to Represent Him, 157 A.L.R. 1225 (originally
printed in 1945, updated weekly).
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of the questions posed in the notes. MI. Lippert also claims he never received assistance to
research laws. Mr. Lippert claimed that counsel failed to prepare him for trial, and that he was
not informed even of the actual date of trial. 8 Mr. Lippert also claimed that he did not know prior
to trial that he would be called to testify, and that it was his belief that the Court coerced him into
testifying. MI. Lippert also claimed that key witnesses were not called at the triaL Mr. Lippert
did admit, during the recent hearing, that appointed counsel did visit him at the jail, usually after
a hearing had taken place in court.
Appointed counsel also testified at the hearing, first explaining procedural matters that
happened during the course of the proceedings which led to trial. Appointed counsel explained
the process of disqualifying the judge originally assigned to the case. Next, appointed counsel
explained that he was appointed to represent Mr. Lippert in several matters, not just the charges
that were tried in this case at hand. Several warrants were issued on these other matters, and
charges on other issues were dismissed because the statute of limitations had expired. Appointed
counsel testified that he spoke with the Defendant prior to and after the preliminary hearing. He
provided the Defendant with all the information that had been obtained in discovery. Appointed
counsel filed motions in limine on behalf of the Defendant and participated in complex pretrial
hearings on these motions. Appointed counsel tracked down two witnesses from out of state at
the request of the Defendant, however, he elected to not subpoena these witnesses after the
Defendant claimed they would just lie about the situation anyway. Appointed counsel explained
that Mr. Lippert was difficult to communicate with because he claimed the victim in the case was
just lying about what had happened. Appointed counsel did claim that communication had

8 While Mr. Lippert claimed to be unaware of the actual date of trial, he was present in Court during all pretrial
proceedings, and the date of the trial was stated during these proceedings, therefore this argument does not support
Mr. Lippert's claims that appointed counsel failed to communicate with him.
MEMORANDUM OPlNION AND ORDER
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broken dovm. following the pretrial motion hearing regarding I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, but even so,
counsel had visited Defendant prior to the trial and that Defendant was aware of the trial date.
He also discussed with Mi. Lippert his right to not testify at trial, and communicated with the
Defendant at trial after he elected to testify. Appointed counsel provided an adequate defense at
trial, providing opening and closing statements, cross-examination of witnesses, presentation of
witnesses on Mi. Lippert's behalf, and made appropriate objections during testimony.
Considering the matter in total, this Court is not convinced that there was a total
breakdown of communication between Mi. Lippert and appointed counsel. Mr. Lippert failed to
provide evidence of a severe or pervasive conflict with counsel, nor did he establish that he had
such minimal contact that meaningful communication was not possible. Therefore, good cause
for the motion for substitution of counsel has not been established on the basis that there was a
total breakdown of communication.
b. Whether the defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the
communication breakdown.
This Court has determined that there was not a total breakdown of communication
between Mr. Lippert and appointed counsel which precluded an adequate defense at trial.
However, in order to provide a complete analysis, this Court will discuss whether the defendant
substantially and unreasonably contributed to any communication brealcdovm. that may have
occurred between himself and appointed counsel, based upon the factors provided in United

States v. Loft, 310 F.3d at 1250.
If a defendant requests substitution of counsel, he may not rely on his ovm. actions to
establish good cause for the motion. "A defendant may not, however, manufacture good cause
by abusive or uncooperative behavior." State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 597, 181 PJd 512, 523
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(Ct. App. 2007), citing United States v. John Doe #1, 272 F.3d at 123. Several cases address the
impact of a defendant's own actions with regard to whether substitute counsel should be
appointed. See Tuitt v. Fair, 882 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1987)(last minute request to substitute
counsel should not be allowed to become a vehicle for achieving delay); United States v.

Andrews, 754 F.Supp. 1195 (N.D. ill. 1990)(disagreements between appointed counsel and
defendant over trial strategy and impetuous relationship do not amount to a conflict necessitating
substitution); United States v. Birrell, 286 F.Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v.

Morsley, 64 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1995).9 Further, the Defendant's last minute request for
substitution of counsel should not be allowed to become a vehicle for achieving delay.
A defendant's belated request for substitution of counsel is granted only where
there exists "good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of
communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust
verdict." McKee, 649 F.2d at 931 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
See also Schmidt, 105 F.3d at 89 ("On the eve of trial, just as during trial, a
. defendant can only substitute new counsel when unusual circumstances are found
to exist, such as' a complete breakdown of communication or an irreconcilable
conflict"); United States v. Llanes, 374 F.2d 712, 717 (2d Cir.1967) ("Judges must
be vigilant that requests for appointment of a new attorney on the eve of trial
should not become a vehicle for achieving delay"). Although a defendant's "loss
of trust" should be considered when assessing whether good cause for the
substitution of assigned counsel exists, the defendant "must neveliheless afford
the court with legitimate reasons for the lack of confidence." McKee, 649 F.2d at
932.

Latterell v. Conway, 430 F.Supp.2d 116, 123 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).

In the caSe at hand, J\1r. Lippert substantially contributed to the breakdown in
communication between himself and counsel, and his request for substitution of counsel made on
the morning of trial was simply a tactic for delaying the trial proceedings. This Court finds that

Mr. Lippert's actions did not rise to the level of egregious, threatening, abusive and

A comprehensive list of similar cases is located at 157 A.L.R. 1225.
12
1\1EMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ON REMAND TO DETERMINE MOTION
FOR SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL
9

uncooperative behavior as compared to the defendant in United States v. John Doe #1,272 F.3d

116 (2nd Cir. 2001), which was discussed in detail above. Nonetheless, Mr. Lippert failed to
engage in meaningful communication with appointed counsel in a manner to best aid in his
defense. Appointed counsel stated that Mr. Lippert was difficult to deal with and would not
discuss the case in more detail than to state that he did not do what was alleged or express his
beliefs that the victim and witnesses were lying. Counsel tracked down two witnesses at Mr.
Lippert's request, but once they were located Mr. Lippert decided they would lie about the facts
surrounding the charges against him. Even though Mr. Lippert complained that appointed
counsel would not visit him at the jail, Mr. Lippert did concede that appointed counsel had come
to the jail after hearings. Based upon this Court's own observations and the testimony provided
at the recent hearing, this Court is not persuaded that the fault for a. possible lack of
communication should be laid squarely on appointed counsel alone, but that:MI. Lippert
substantially contributed to any breakdown of communication by his own actions.
Having reviewed the factors set out in United States v. Lott, this Court is unpersuaded
that a complete, irrevocable breakdown of communication occurred in the case at hand, thus,
good cause for substitution of counsel on the morning of trial was not established. The Court
fmds that while communication between appointed counsel and:MI. Lippert was difficult, it had
not irretrievably and completely broken down to the point that :MI. Lippert could not aid in his
own defense. Further, Mr. Lippert substantially contributed to the difficulty of communicating
through his own actions. Therefore, the Defendant has not established good cause for the motion
for substitution of counsel on the morning of trial.
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3. Did an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict exist in this
matter?
Lastly, good cause for the substitution of counsel may be established if an irreconcilable
conflict leads to an apparently unjust verdict. This issue was not argued by the Defendant in
briefmg, nevertheless, the Court will address this issue in determining whether good cause
existed for the substitution of counsel in this case. An irreconcilable conflict which lead to an
apparently unjust verdict was discussed in Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970). In
this case, a dispute arose almost immediately between the defendant and his assigned counsel.
The defendant filed four motions for substitution of counsel, all of which were denied by the trial
court without inquiry. Id. at 1169. The defendant "was forced into a trial with the assistance of a
particular lawyer with whom he was dissatisfied, with whom he would not cooperate, and with
whom he would not, in any manner whatsoever, communicate." Id. The reviewing court
determined that the attorney was understandably deprived of the power to present an adequate
defense on the defendant's behalf due to the complete lack of communication. Id. The
defendant was found guilty by jury of first degree murder, and the trial judge promptly reduced
the offense to murder in the second degree. Id. The reviewing court found, however, that it was
"not unreasonable to believe that had Brown been represented by counsel in whom he had
confidence he would have been convicted, if at all, of no more than the offense of manslaughter."

ld. at 1170. Clearly, in Brown v. Craven, the irreconcilable conflict between counsel and the
defendant resulted in an unjust verdict offust degree murder.

In the case at hand, there is no suggestion that the verdict reached was an unjust verdict
This case is distinguishable from Brown. First, in Brown, there was no communication in any
manner between counsel and client almost immediately, as a result of a conflict that occurred
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shortly after counsel's appointment to the case. The same cannot be said in the case at hand.
Further, it was clear that the trial judge in Brown was convinced immediately that an unjust
verdict had been reached by the jury, and the trial judge promptly reduced the verdict to murder

in the second degree. 10 There is no such disparity in the verdict determined by the jury in the
case before this Court. Therefore, good cause for substitution of counsel cannot be based upon
an argument that there was an irreconcilable conflict which led to an apparently unjust verdict.

This Court has reviewed whether :Mr. Lippert possessed good cause for his request for
substitute counsel on the morning of the fIrst day of trial. The Court has considered, fIrst,
whether there was an actual conflict of interest; second, whether there was a complete,
irrevocable breakdown of communication; and third, whether there was an irreconcilable conflict
which lead to an apparently unjust verdict. Finding good cause absent, this Court determines that
a substitution of counsel was not walTanted on the morning of the first day of trial.
CONCLUSION
On remand, this Court was required to conduct a meaningful inquiry to determine
whether :Mr. Lippert possessed good cause for his request for substitute counsel on the morning
of the fIrst day of his criminal trial. A hearing was held on the matter and briefs were submitted

in the weeks following the hearing. This Court reviewed whether good cause was established
based on whether there "was an actual conflict of interest; whether there was a complete
irrevocable breakdown of communication; or whether there was an irreconcilable conflict which

10 The Brown Court reversed judgment and remanded for a new trial. The trial court was directed to "grant Brown a
new trial attended with all reasonable assurance that he be represented by competent counsel, from the Public
Defender's office or elsewhere, in whom he may, ifhe does not demonstrate obstinance, recalcitrance, or
unreasonable contumacy, repose his confidence." Id. at 1170.
15
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Lead to an apparently unjust verdict. For the foregoing reasons, this Court determines
that good cause did not exist for the substitution of counsel.

ORDER
On remand, it is determined that the Defendant's Motion for Substitution of
Counsel is hereby DENIED.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED.

/)tJt'~

DATED this...cc. day of February 2011.

CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge
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I hereby certify that a true copy of
the foregoing ORDER VACATING
AND
REENTERING
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
ON REMAND
TO
DETERMINE
MOTION
FOR
SUBSTITUE
COUNSEL
was
mailed, postage prepaid, by the
pndersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
Zzr'd.ay of February, 2011, on:

Lori M. Gilmore
POBox 2627
Orofmo ID 83544
Ken Nagy
POBox 164
Lewiston, ID 83501
Robert S. Lippert #81816
ICC B-207-B
POBox 70010
Boise ID 83707
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ROBERT S. LIPPERT
#81816, ICC
PO BOX 70010
BOISE, ID 83707
Defendant-Appellant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
000

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
-vsROBERT S. LIPPERT,
Defendant-Appellant.

CASE NO. CR 2005-561

)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)
)
)
)
)

-----------------------------)
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE PARTY'S
ATTORNEY'S, CLEARWATER COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK
OF THE ABOVE-NAMED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Defendant-Appellant, appeals against the State of Idaho to
the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Vacating and Reentering Memorandum
Opinion and Order On Remand To Determine Motion For Substitute Counsel
re-entered into the record on February 22, 2011, based on the District
Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of law, and order on Petition for
Post Conviction Relief in Clearwater County case number CV09-00194 , the
Honorable Carl B. Kerrick, District Judge presiding.

2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the
Judgments described in paragraph one (1) above is appeallable pursuant to
Rule 11(c) (1-10), IAR.

3.

That the Defendant requests the entire reporter's standard transcript as
defined in Rule 25(c), IAR, and was lodged previously in Supreme Court
Case No. 33028, State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 181 P.3d 512 (Ct. App.
2008) •

4.

The Defendant also requests the preparation of the following additional
portions of the transcript:

NOTICE OF APPEAL

-1-

September 15, 2008, Hearing held as a result of Idaho Court of Appeals
Ruling in Supreme Court case number 33028.

(b)

The Reporter's Transcript that was previously lodged in Supreme Court
case number 33028.

5.

Defendant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant to Rule 28(b)(2), JAR,
and for judicial economy requests that the standard clerk's record that was
lodged in Supreme Court case number 33028 be submitted.

6.

The Defendant also requests in addition to the standard clerk's record pursuant
to Rule 28(b)(2), IAR, the following:

7.

8.

(a)

(a)

Any Briefs or Memorandums filed or lodged by the state, the defendant or
the Court in support of, or in opposition to, matters that took place in
the district court remand proceedings as set forth in the Idaho Surpeme
Court's Case Number 33028.

(b)

Any motions or responses, including all attachments, affidavits and their
exhibits, or copies of transcripts, filed or lodged by the state, defendant
or the Court in support of, or in opposition to, the proceedings that took
place in the district court due to the remand by the Idaho Supreme Court
case number 33028.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter.

(b)

That the Defendant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee
because he is indigent person and is unable to pay said fee.

(c)

That the Defendant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the
preparation of the record because he is an indegent person and is unable
to pay said fee.

(d)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20, JAR.

That the Defendant anticipates raising issues including, but not limited to:
Did the District Court exercise an abuse of discretion in determining that good
cause did not exist for the substitution of counsel and denied Defendant's Motion
for Substitution of Counsel, when it is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States?

Rk.tJ ' ~~R4;

DATED MARCH~, 2011.

Robert S. Lippert, 'Appellant
NOTICE OF APPEAL
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO

),

County of ADA

)

ss.
ROBERT S. LIPPERT, being sworn, deposes and says:
That the party is the appellant in the above-entitled appeal and that all
statements in this Notice of Appeal are true and correct to the best of his
knowledge and belief.

&dJ~i .

Robert S. Lippert, Xppellant
, 'if;.

SUBSCRIBED, SWORN and AFFIRMED to on I;Y day
t~¥-"'''''-··

;:~

!",--J'!':'A:-:;ME:'::S~G~.Q~U!~NN~""""'t

U

NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

~::',
\,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on MARCH~, 2011, I mailed the original to the Court
for the purposes of filing and a true and correct copy via prison mail system, U.S.
Mail first class postage to:
CLEARWATER COUNTY PROSECUTOR
PO BOX 2627
OROFINO, ID 83544
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL
ATTN: CRIMINAL LAW DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0010
IDAHO SUPREME COURT CLERK
PO BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0101
NANCY TOWLER, REPORTER
NEZ PERCE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
PO BOX 896
LEWISTON, ID 83501

If2ktl-t;;J
Robert S. Lippert

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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Inmate name Robert S. Lippert
IDOC No. #81816, ICC
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Defendant-Appellant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE ---------------SECOND
JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
ROBERT S. LIPPERT
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR 2005-561
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT FOR
APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL

----------------------------~)
COMES NOW,

ROBERT S. tIPPERT

, Defendant-Appellant in the

above entitled matter and moves this Honorable Court to grant Defendant-Appellant's Motion
for Appointment of Counsel for the reasons more fully set forth herein and in the Affidavit in
Support of Motion for Appointment of Counsel.
1.

Defendant-Appellant is currently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of

Corrections under the direct care, custody and control of Warden Timothy Wengler
of the Idaho Correctional Center, Boise, JD
2.

The issues to be presented in this case may become to complex for the Defendant-

Appellant to properly pursue. Defendant-Appellant lacks the knowledge and skill' needed to
represent himlherself.

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - 1
Revised: 10117/05

3.

Defendant-Appellant required assitance completing these pleadings, as he/she was
unable to do it himlherself.

4.

Def~ndant-Appellant

requeststbe Stare Appellate Public Defender
be appointed in these matters.
DATED this
day of
~h....
,20_.

AiH-

Js±

Defendant-Appellant

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

STATE OF IDAHO
County of

ADA

)
) ss
)

-=-R=O=B=E=RT.::.. . . ;S=-.. . . .-=L=I=P-"'-P..=E""R=T_ _ _ _, after first being duly sworn upon hislher oath, deposes
and says as follows:
1.

I am the Affiant in the above-entitled case;

2.

I am currently residing at the Idaho Correctional Center, Boise, ID.
under the care, custody and control of Warden Timothy Weng] er

3.

I am indigent and do not have any funds to hire private counsel;

4.

I am without bank. accounts, stocks, bonds, real estate or any other form of real

property;
5.

I am unabl~ to provide any other form of security;

6.

I am untrained in the law;

7.

If I am forced to proceed without counsel being appointed I will be unfairly

handicapped in competing with trained and competent counsel of the State;
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - 2
Revised: 10/17/05

Further your affiant sayeth !laught.
WHEREFORE, Defendant-Appellant respectfully prays that this Honorable
Court issue it's Order granting Defendant-Appellant's Motion for Appointment of Counsel to
represent hislher interest, or in the alternative grant any such relief to which it may appear the
Defendant-Appellant is entitled to.
DATED This

1"'z r day of--,-~--,,-,,-,--,=A,-,_ _ _ _ _, 20-LL.

ST

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN AND AFFIRMED to before me this
of

{V)c(fC>~

L

day

,20_"_.

(SEAL)
ComlllsslOn exprres:

ID

,

(3
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

M

day of

&arc/h

, 20

/! , I

mailed a copy of this MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL for the purposes of filing with the court and of mailing a true and correct copy via
prison mail system for processing to the U.S. mail system to:

Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

Lori:LMW Gff:1Ih0r·e::- -eputy County Prosecuting Attorney

PO BOX 2627
Orofino,

ID 83544
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ROBERT S. LIPPERT
Full Name of Party Filing This Document

#81816, ICC
Mailing Address (Street or Post Office Box)

PO BOX 70010
City, State and Zip Code

BOISE,

ID 83707

Telephone Number

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

SECOND

OF THE'STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
Case No.: CR
STATE OF IDAHO

JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CLEARWATER

2005-561

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR
PERMISSION TO PROCEED ON PARTIAL
PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER)

Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT S. LIPPERT
Defendant.

IMPORTANT NOTICE: Idaho Code § 31-3220A requires that you serve upon counselfor
the county sheriff, the department of correction or the private correctional facility..
whichever may apply, a copy of this motion and affidavit and any other documents filed
in connection with this request. You must file proof of such service with the court when
you file this document.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of
[

ADA

)
) ss.
)

] Plaintiff [ !] Defendant asks to start or defend this case on partial payment of court

fees, and swears under oath
1. Thisisanactionfor(typeofcase)

Appeal of Memorandum Decision. I

believe I'm entitled to get what I am as king for.

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES
(PRISONER)
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CAO HOC 2125/2005

-,.-

2. [.{' have not previously brought this claim against the same party or a claim based on
the same operative facts in any state or federal court. [

] I have filed this claim against the

same party or a claim based on the same oper ative facts in a state or federal court.
3. I am unable to pay all the court costs now.

I have attached to this affidavit a cur rent

statement of my inmate account, certified by a custodian of inm ate accounts, that reflects the
activity of the account over my period of incarceration or for the last twelve (12) months,
whichever is less.

4. I understand I will be required to pay an initial partial filing fee in the am ount of 20% of the
greater of: (a) the average monthly deposits to my inmate account or (b) the average monthly
balance in my inmate account for the last six (6) months. I also understand that I must pay the
remainder of the filing fee by making monthly paym ents of 20% of the preceding month's
income in my inmate account until the fee is paid in full.

5. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true. I understand that a false
statement in this affidavit is perjury and I could be sent to prison for an additional fourteen (14)
years.
Do not leave any items blank. If any item does not apply, write "N/A". Attach additional pages
if more space is needed fo r any response.
IDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCE:
Name:

ROBERT S. LIPPERT

Address: #81816.

Other name(s) I have used:

ICC, PO BOX 70010, BOISE. ID 83707

How long at that address?
Date and place of birth:

Po b 5u-tf

Phone: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

i1141v'L(iiJ.. 6clls)

Of~

DEPENDENTS:
I am

J><l single [

] married. If married, you must provide the following information:

Nameofspouse: _____________________________________________________
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PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES
(PRISONER)
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My other dependents (including minor children) are: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

INCOME:

My spouse's income: $ -.L.I'---!..-'--_ _ per [
ASSETS:

J week

[

J month.

IJo /1 {2

List all real property (land and buildings) owned or being purchased by you.
Your
Address

City

State

Legal
Description

Value

Equity

List all other property owned by you and state its value.

Description (provide description for each item)
Cash In/1"J,.1tK

Ly«f.!/-

Value

RC-Cd(d/ll

Notes and Recei vables
Vehicles:
BanklC redit Union/Savinqs/C heckinq Accounts
Stocks/Bonds/I nvestm ents/Certificates of Deposit
Trust Funds
Retirement Accounts/IRAs/401 (k)s
Cash Value Insurance
Motorcvcles/Boats/RV s/Snowmobiles:
Furniture/Aooliances
Jewelry/Antiques/Coli ectibles
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Description (provide description for each item)

Value

TVs/Stereos/ComDuters/Electronics

/(//,,~-----

Tools/Eauiom ent
Soortinq Goods/Guns
Horses/LivestocklTack

v

Other. (describe)

EXPENSES: List all of your monthly expenses.
Expense
Rent/House Pavm ent
Vehicle Payment( s)

Average
Monthly Payment

/V!t/9!
~

.-:---

Credit Cards: (list each account number)

Loans: (name of lender and reason for loan)

Electricity/Natural Gas
WaterlSewerITrash
Phone
Groceries
Clothina
Auto Fuel
Auto Maintenance
Cosmetics/Haircuts/Salons
Entertainment/Books/M agazines

~

Home Insurance
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Average
Monthly Payment

Expense

AJ/d

Auto Insurance
Life Insurance
Medical Insurance
Medical Expense
Other

MISCELLANEOUS:
How much can you borrow? $ ____69_-_,1,_,_ _ _ From whom? _ _ _ _ _ _'"_'_ _ __
When did you file your last income tax return? _ _ _ _ Amount of refund: $_ _ _ _ __
PERSONAL REFERENCES: (These persons must be able to verify information provided)
Name

Address

Phone

Years Known

Robert S. Lippert

20~SUBSCRIBED

Typed or Printed Name

d,ay~ ~~~h

.

,51
~/JEL.~~"
f'k{ary Putllrc for Idaho

AND SWORN TO before me th\".

Residing at _ _ _ _ _ _-,-_ _ __
My Commission expires _ _ _ _ _-'--_
..•

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES
(PRISONER)
CAO 1-10C 2125/2005

~
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IDOC TRUST

===========

OFFENDER BANK BALANCES

==========

)oc No: 81816
Name: LIPPERT I ROBERT S
cccount: CHK Status: ACTIVE

02/28/2011

=

ICC/UNIT J PRES FACIL
TIER-O CELL-2

Transaction Dates: 02/28/2010-02/28/2011
Beginning
Balance
67.43

Total
Total
Current
Charges
Payments
Balance
285.85
212.43
5.99DB
=============================== TRANSACTIONS ================================
late
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
3/09/2010
3/12/2010
3/16/2010
3/25/2010
3/29/2010
3/30/2010
4/06/2010
4/06/2010
4/06/2010
4/08/2010
4/09/2010
4/15/2010
4/15/2010
4/15/2010
4/16/2010
5/03/2010
5/06/2010
5/13/2010
5/13/2010
5/19/2010
5/19/2010
0/26/2010
0/26/2010
1/02/2010
1/03/2010
1/03/2010
1/04/2010
1/29/2010
1/30/2010
2/02/2010
2/16/2010
2/17/2010
2/20/2010
2/20/2010
2/20/2010
2/20/2010
2/23/2010
2/27/2010
1/04/2011

IC0491857-726
IC0492324-005
HQ0492653-018
IC0493726-004
IC0493937-025
IC0494027-626
IC0494765-598
IC0494955-006
IC0494963-016
HQ0495331-019
IC0495425-015
IC0496206-024
IC0496224-004
IC0496224-006
IC0496361-006
IC0497880-005
IC0498702-021
IC0499904-011
IC0499906-020
IC0500422-001
IC0500422-002
HQ0519688-006
IC0519743-002
IC0520360-558
IC0520665-021
IC0520688-028
IC0520815-022
IC0523403-004
IC0523588-007
IC0524096-001
IC0526441-019
IC0526568-460
IC0526631-460
IC0526723-460
IC0526726-460
IC0526728-460
HQ0527268-001
IC0527541-028
IC0528324-664

099-COMM SPL
070-PHOTO COpy
011-RCPT MO/CC
070-PHOTO COPY
078-MET MAIL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
071-MED CO-PAY
070-PHOTO COpy
061-CK INMATE
071-MED CO-PAY
078-MET MAIL
070-PHOTO COPY
070-PHOTO COPY
070-PHOTO COPY
070-PHOTO COPY
071-MED CO-PAY
078-MET MAIL
070-PHOTO COPY
317-REFUND MEDICAL
317-REFUND MEDICAL
011-RCPT MO/CC
070-PHOTO COpy
099-COMM SPL
078-MET MAIL
071-MED CO-PAY
070-PHOTO COPY
078-MET MAIL
070-PHOTO COPY
325-REFUND PHOTO C
071-MED CO-PAY
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
071-MED CO-PAY
099-COMM SPL

90231
764526
95766
95765
26036
69684
21212
25393
95814
95813
95815
94757
95398
27571
98284
91816
FIX495425
FIX498702
076751
114112
116687
40590
118913
110610
110611
FIX519743
40229

288105
37898

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION
TO PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER)

20.11DB
0.20DB
50.00
0.10DB
5.10DB
27.45DB
7.42DB
2.00DB
0.10DB
40.00DB
3.00DB
8.09DB
0.10DB
14.30DB
2.60DB
0.30DB
3.00DB
1.32DB
1.20DB
3.00
3.00
50.00
5.10DB
26.73DB
1.32DB
3.00DB
1.00DB
1.22DB
1.40DB
5.10
3.00DB
2.12DB
2.12DB
-2.12DB
-2.12DB
2.12DB
100.00
3.00DB
47.25DB

47.32
47.12
97.12
97.02
91.92
64.47
57.05
55.05
54.95
14.95
11.95
3.86
3.76
10.54DB
13.14DB
13.44DB
16.44DB
17.76DB
18.96DB
15.96DB
12.96DB
37.04
31.94
5.21
3.89
0.89
O.llDB
1.33DB
2.73DB
2.37
0.63DB
2.75DB
4.87DB
2.75DB
0.63DB
2.75DB
97.25
94.25
47.00

IDOC TRUST

===========

OFFENDER BANK BALANCES

==========

)oc No: 81816
Name: LIPPERT, ROBERT S
\..ccount: CHK Status: ACTIVE

02/28/2011

=

ICC/UNIT J PRES FACIL
TIER-O CELL-2

Transaction Dates: 02/28/2010-02/28/2011
Beginning
Balance
67.43

Total
Total
Current
Charges
Payments
Balance
285.85
212.43
5.99DB
================================ TRANSACTIONS ================================
)ate
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
._--------

-------------

------------------

----------

)1/07/2011
)1/07/2011
)1/11/2011
)1/11/2011
)1/21/2011
)2/08/2011
)2/15/2011
)2/25/2011

IC0529080-015
IC0529127-003
IC0529332-615
IC0529335-016
IC0530604-003
IC0532636-555
IC0533363-688
IC0534631-014

078-MET MAIL
070-PHOTO COPY
099-COMM SPL
100-CR INM CMM
078-MET MAIL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
071-MED CO-PAY

128313
128312
129821
045335
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----------

1.76DB
2.70DB
21.12DB
1. 33
14.95DB
6.84DB
0.95DB
6.00DB

-----------

45.24
42.54
21.42
22.75
7.80
0.96
0.01
5.99DB
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Fax Server

Inmale name Robert S. Lippert
TDOCNo. if8l8l6, ICC
Address PO BOX 70010
BOISE, ID 83707

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE _...;,:S:.o:EC""-'O=N"""D_ _ _ _ JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF TIIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARHATER

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
VS.

ROBERT 8, LIPPERT
Defen dan t-Appellant.

Case No. CR 2005-561
ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL

IT IS lIEARBY ORDERED that t11e Defendant-Appellant's Motion for
Appointment of Counsel is granted and the State Appellate Public Defender's
Office, a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is hereby appointed to represent

said defendant in all proceedings involving the Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion.

District Judge

\.
\

')

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
Revised 10117/05

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
STATE OF IDAHO,
SUPREME COURT NO. 38613
Plaintiff/Respondent,
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

v.

ROBERT S. LIPPERT,
Defendant/Appellant
On Appeal.
I, Courtney Stifanick, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
the County of Clearwater, do hereby certify that copies of the
Clerk's Record were placed in the United States mail and
addressed to Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General,

P. O.

Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0188 and STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, 10

83703 this

1~

day

of April 2011.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of the said Court this

:t~

day of April 2011.
DISTRICT COURT

1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

